There is a glaring disconnect between policy and practical action in the Northern Territory.
Focusing the Australian Defence Force on Northern Australia is a straightforward decision. The Defence Strategic Review, National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Plan all highlight the necessity of deterring potential adversaries from projecting power against Australia through our northern approaches. These documents also emphasise the need for a well-connected and resilient network of bases to enhance the ADF’s operational capabilities in the north.
But transport and port infrastructure still look inadequate, ADF forces in the Northern Territory are decreasing, not building up, and it’s not clear that the area has Defence and civilian capacity to cope with demanding military contingencies. This needs to be tested.
Australia and the United States have made significant investments in the Royal Australian Air Force’s Tindal base, near Katherine in the Northern Territory, recognising its strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia has committed to further upgrading infrastructure and enhancing capabilities at Tindal, including for airfield operations and logistics support. Meanwhile, the US has bolstered its presence through initiatives such as increased deployment of aircraft and personnel, consolidating Tindal as a critical hub for regional security operations.
Despite these investments, questions remain about whether the base and connective transport and logistical infrastructure are sufficiently networked to ensure a robust response capability in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges. For example, it’s uncertain whether there are enough suitable trucks available to move fuels from Darwin to Tindal during periods of high operational tempo, or, without a rail link to the base, how munitions and other items can be brought from Adelaide to Tindal.
The ADF has recognised the need for enhanced training areas in the Northern Territory, spending significantly to ensure personnel are prepared for diverse operational scenarios. This includes expanding existing training facilities and developing new sites that exploit the region’s unique geographical features, allowing for more effective live-fire exercises and joint operations. However, the challenge remains that fewer, not more, Australian soldiers will be in the Northern Territory to fully use these enhanced training areas.
The Darwin-based 1st Brigade was once the most lethal formation in the Australian Army. In 2019, it was stripped of its tanks, armoured vehicles and mechanised designation as part of the army’s restructuring efforts.
All Darwin-based helicopters will have left by the end of 2024. The army is concentrating helicopters in Townsville.
In September 2023, the government announced army restructuring. The 1st Brigade was designated as a light combat brigade focussed on agility and deployment in the littoral environment. The Townsville-based 3rd Brigade was designated as an armoured brigade suiting amphibious operations with the Royal Australian Navy. Most of the army’s new amphibious vessels will be based in Townsville. The 1st Brigade’s amphibious vessels will be based in the already crowded HMAS Coonawarra in Darwin.
The army’s long-range fire capability, deterring potential adversaries from projecting power against Australia through our northern approaches, will confusingly be based in Adelaide. This is despite road and rail infrastructure between Adelaide and Darwin remaining unacceptably vulnerable to weather disruption. Moving by air is hardly an answer since airlift capacity never seems sufficient even in exercises, and Australia barely has any merchant shipping to call on.
The Royal Australian Navy has several vessels based in Darwin, including the Armidale-class patrol boats and the soon to commissioned Arafura-class patrol ships. The versatile Arafuras will bolster the navy’s capabilities in northern waters. However, the navy has limited moorings and options for supporting and rearming vessels in Darwin, Australia’s most northern deep port. Thus, the ships would all have to travel great distances from likely combat zones just to be combat ready once more.
There is a clear gap between the Northern Territory policy in the National Defence Strategy and action. While the US strengthens its presence and capabilities in the Northern Territory as part of its force posture initiative, Australia’s action is spending on bases and training areas.
There can be no doubt that Defence faces logistical and workforce challenges in the Northern Territory, and policy to address these comes with a price tag. Arguably, this is why, during a meeting in Hawaii earlier this year, a senior Australian defence official told US Army Pacific representatives that there was neither room nor industry-support capacity for them to preposition equipment in the Northern Territory.
For years, Defence has suffered from cultural resistance to being in the Northern Territory. It’s time to move beyond that.
The next step in continued implementation of the National Defence Strategy should be to hold a nationally coordinated, simulated stress test of the region’s Defence and civilian capacity to withstand a range of contingencies. The simulations should involve desktop exercises that access datasets from industry, state and the territory government. In addition to testing legal frameworks, strategic reserves, logistics and transport infrastructure, and force posture, attention should be directed to questions of time and space for responses.