Nuclear war in Asia would be Australia’s problem, too. We must prepare
10 Jun 2025|

Australia must be prepared for limited nuclear war in the Indo-Pacific, be it over Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, or beyond. It should understand what such a conflict would mean for regional and global security, and specifically for the Australian Defence Force.

In September 2022, North Korea’s regime passed a law declaring a new nuclear doctrine. It raised the prospect of nuclear first-use, either to pre-empt a perceived threat or, according to the law’s wording, to ‘take the initiative in war.’ The law rejected denuclearisation, instead calling for an ‘exponential’ increase in the country’s nuclear weapons capabilities. North Korea has since expanded its stock of tactical nuclear weapons. This includes low-yield capabilities that the regime might use pre-emptively to gain operational initiative, rather than to deter or end conflict. Pyongyang’s goal is not one of escalating to de-escalate; it’s escalating to win.

At the same time, China has rapidly expanded and modernised its nuclear forces, and there have been troubling signs that its own ‘no first-use’ policy is weakening. In recent weeks, conflict between India and Pakistan—two nuclear-armed states—raised fears of nuclear escalation. These events should make clear to Australian defence planners that the risk of nuclear war, including limited nuclear warfare in Asia, is rising.

High-intensity war in the Indo-Pacific leading to the use of nuclear weapons is a live possibility. Australian defence policy must explore how the ADF could support coalition operations in a nuclear scenario, be it in relation to Taiwan, in response to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, or indeed both simultaneously.

First, the ADF should ensure it has the means to contribute to integrated conventional and nuclear operations—US and allied conventional operations coordinated with US nuclear retaliatory strikes against a nuclear-armed adversary. This could include long-range strike by air and naval forces; commitment of enabling assets such as the E-7 Wedgetail air-surveillance aircraft; and logistics equipment such as the Royal Australian Air Force’s KC-30A tankers. The Pine Gap joint facility would also play an important role in detecting a nuclear attack in Asia and supporting any coalition responses. Future ADF-controlled satellites for communications support as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance could—and should—enhance this capability.

Second, the ADF should prepare to support coalition integrated air and missile defence. The Royal Australian Navy’s Hobart-class destroyers, with SM-6 and SM-2MR air defence missiles, offer a missile defence capability that could defend coalition forces, both at sea and on land, against ballistic or cruise missiles. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review signalled acquisition of land-based integrated air and missile defence capabilities as a priority. If the upcoming funding plan, the 2026 Integrated Investment Program, provides clear guidance on this acquisition, such capabilities could further strengthen a coalition’s ability to counter adversary missile threats from the land.

Third, at the policy level, Australia should more actively support and strengthen US extended nuclear deterrence and be ready to support nuclear operations to restore deterrence should it fail. Australia already supports extended nuclear deterrence by hosting joint facilities, but it could also consider further expanding and increasing US long-range bomber access to Australian air bases under the Enhanced Air Cooperation agreement. This would allow for more regular forward basing and create opportunities for the RAAF to support US Air Force long-range bomber operations.

However, the government is reluctant to discuss Australia’s role in supporting US extended nuclear deterrence, beyond a cursory reference in the National Defence Strategy and an allusion to the role of joint facilities. This is an unhelpful public stance.

As my ASPI colleague Alex Bristow has argued, Australia needs to develop sufficient policy sense to advance its own position on conventional-nuclear integration, escalation, and war termination. It must learn from NATO’s structures without necessarily copying them and talk to the United States, Japan, South Korea, Britain and France about nuclear issues without assuming that our viewpoints align perfectly with theirs. There is an AUKUS dimension too, as US submarines operating from Submarine Rotation Force–West may be nuclear-armed by the mid-2030s, and the conventionally armed submarines and Pillar Two technologies that Australia is acquiring will affect the regional nuclear balance.

To move forward, Australia could adopt a more active role in key dialogues such as the Strategic Policy Dialogue and the US-Australia Defence Policy and Strategy Talks. The significance of these dialogues should be emphasised in AUSMIN communiques. They should also lead to a dedicated extended deterrence dialogue, following the examples of US-Japan and US-South Korea dialogues, which have existed for more than 15 years.

Australia must think not only about how best it can contribute to nuclear crisis management; it should also plan for what happens after nuclear weapons are used. Ideally, the nuclear genie stays firmly contained: deterrence holds, and actual nuclear use is avoided. But should the nuclear taboo be broken, Australia and its allies will face an entirely different set of challenges. We must be ready.