Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s South China Sea policy has many contradictions and inconsistencies, particularly regarding China’s nine-dash line. In separate joint statements Indonesia has shown an inconsistent stance on China’s maritime claims.

Indonesia’s parliament is in the process of  ratifying a treaty signed with Vietnam last year,  delimiting their exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea. Prabowo is committed to ratifying the treaty and is planning to formally sign it during an upcoming visit to Vietnam. The treaty is significant not only because it finally ended the 12 years of military boundary delimitation between Indonesia and Vietnam, but also because both Indonesia and Vietnam disregarded China’s nine-dash line, which overlaps their agreed boundary. China protested the agreement.

But in November last year, during Prabowo’s state visit to Beijing, Indonesia and China released a joint statement in which, for the first time, Indonesia formally recognised that it has an overlapping maritime claim with China. This recognition was an aberration of decades of Indonesian policy, which had never recognised any such overlap. Since Indonesia and China aren’t neighbours, it is China’s disputed nine-dash line that overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.

The agreement has thus been criticised for apparently endorsing China’s nine-dash line claim, which is not based on international law, as per the 2016 ruling against the line.

However, after the joint statement provoked controversies, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that reiterated that Indonesia does not recognise China’s nine-dash line, and that all cooperation should be based on UNCLOS. In addition, after Beijing, Prabowo visited Washington to meet US president Joe Biden. During the visit, Indonesia and the United States released a joint statement reiterating the importance of respecting the 2016 tribunal decision and compliance with UNCLOS. This seems to contradict Indonesia’s joint statement with China, which clearly disregarded the 2016 arbitration tribunal.

The recognition of the overlapping claim with China calls into question Indonesia’s ability to ratify the treaty with Vietnam, which was signed almost two years earlier. If Indonesia recognises an overlapping claim with China, it must implicitly acknowledge an overlapping claim with China in the agreement with Vietnam.

However, in several meetings with Vietnamese President Luong Cuong, Prabowo has reiterated Indonesia’s commitment to ratify the agreement. On this basis, Prabowo should rescind recognition of the overlapping claim with China, as well as any commitment to joint development of the area with Beijing.

Yet another contradiction came up during Prabowo’s remarks in the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in Turkey, where he mentioned the overlap with China. He suggested a joint venture, particularly in relation to granting fishing licenses for fisherman from both countries in the overlapping maritime area.

Such inconsistency also affects the ongoing negotiation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China on a code of conduct in the South China Sea. As Indonesia has not recognised the nine-dash line, Jakarta has rejected it as a basis for the negotiations. Other ASEAN countries have questioned what the joint statement meant for Indonesia’s position in the negotiations, but no clear answer has emerged.

There are two possible explanations for why Indonesia pursues this inconsistent policy.

First, Prabowo may not be aware that all these policies contradict one another, or that recognising the overlapping maritime claim with China means that Indonesia agrees on something that is illegal under international law. He may also not be aware that recognising an overlapping claim with China affects the Indonesia-Vietnam agreement. He may think that these policies are unrelated, and may not even be aware of the exact locations of the overlapping claim with China.

Second, Prabowo may want to make ambiguity part of his strategy. He may have wanted to please China with the recognition of the overlapping claim in the joint statement. However, at the same time, he may have known that the joint development could not be implemented, including due to the ratification of the Indonesia-Vietnam agreement.

It is still too early to judge what Prabowo has in mind for Indonesia’s South China Sea policy. It remains an open question whether Indonesia will implement the joint development. What is clear is that, by recognising the overlapping maritime claim, Indonesia has helped China pursue its territorial ambitions.