The Economist called ^[1] Taiwan ‘the most dangerous place on earth’ in 2021. For the island’s 23 million people, that danger isn’t abstract; it’s a daily reality shaped by the constant shadow of conflict. Across the Taiwan Strait, China’s leaders see the island not as a neighbour but as unfinished business, a critical piece of President Xi Jinping’s vision of national rejuvenation. As Chinese coercion increases and the status quo across the Strait deteriorates, countries in the Indo-Pacific need to do more to maintain balance and deter conflict.

The second instalment of ASPI’s Pressure Points ^[2] series, released today, covers Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, Asia’s most volatile flashpoint. Where the first part of Pressure Points examined China’s air and maritime coercion within the first island chain, this instalment focuses on China’s coercion across the Taiwan Strait. It examines how Beijing frames its claim to Taiwan, the coercive tools it increasingly wields to enforce that claim, how Taipei is responding to mounting pressure and how other governments are managing the growing risk of confrontation. It also details potential scenarios that Xi may pursue to forcibly unify Taiwan. The result is a concise and interactive account of one of the Indo-Pacific’s most consequential flashpoints.

The Chinese Communist Party has never governed Taiwan. But since 1949, the party has consistently upheld its ‘One China’ principle. Under Xi, such claims have become more assertive and nationalistic. Xi’s framing of Taiwan as central to the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ has fused what was once a territorial question with the fate of the party itself, an ideological escalation that narrows room for compromise.

Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan isn’t new, but under Xi it has intensified dramatically. Military pressure that once flared episodically has become constant. Chinese aircraft and warships now operate around the island with such regularity that what once constituted a crisis has been normalised. These incursions are carefully calibrated: provocative enough to signal dominance, restrained enough to avoid triggering outright conflict. The cumulative effect is to shrink Taiwan’s operating space, desensitise the region to Chinese military activity and normalise coercion as the baseline of cross-Strait relations.

China’s military has invested heavily in advanced capabilities designed to neutralise Taiwan’s defences and deter outside intervention, particularly from the United States. This rapidly modernising force comprises hypersonic missiles, integrated air defences, autonomous and undersea systems, and amphibious lift capacity. Each Chinese exercise and patrol refines operational readiness and tests the responses of Taiwan and its regional countries.

For Taiwan, this pressure is omnipresent. Yet most citizens continue their lives with stoic normalcy. Beneath that resilience, public sentiment is evolving. While many Taiwanese still favour maintaining the status quo, support for greater recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty and international identity is growing. Few Taiwanese wish for formal independence if it risks war, but fewer still identify with the mainland or share the CCP’s narrative.

Taiwan’s defence posture reflects this complexity. Since 1949, Taiwanese leaders have repeatedly shifted strategy, alternating between conventional deterrence, high-end modernisation and, more recently, asymmetric defence built on mobility and resilience. President Lai Ching-te has sought to weave these strands into a whole-of-society strategy that strengthens deterrence, manages tensions and enhances national resilience. He faces an unenviable task: to prepare for war without provoking it, and to maintain deterrence without eroding domestic cohesion.

Taiwan today is arguably more outmatched militarily by China than at any time in modern history, yet it is also determined to endure. With finite resources, Taipei is investing in survivability: hardening infrastructure, dispersing forces and fostering whole-of-society readiness that extends beyond the military.

For other countries, supporting Taiwan’s defence and security presents a delicate balancing act: too little support risks leaving Taiwan exposed to coercion and weakens efforts to deter Beijing from engaging in a catastrophic war, yet too much support risks provoking Beijing. Many governments have thus chosen carefully calibrated measures. The logic is clear: while overt confrontation with Beijing would be disastrous, allowing China to advance its objectives unopposed poses an even greater threat to regional stability. The status quo, once seen as a buffer against conflict, is no longer stable. It is dynamic and eroding under the weight of China’s growing military presence and unrelenting exercises.

Taiwan’s security depends on a broader framework that integrates defence, diplomacy and resilience. A whole-of-society approach, with support from likeminded partners, offers the best chance of sustaining stability while managing escalation. That framework need not be purely military. People-to-people exchanges, technology partnerships, shared resilience training and diplomatic coordination can reinforce Taiwan’s ability to withstand pressure without crossing Beijing’s red lines. Such an approach recognises that Taiwan’s strength lies not only in its asymmetric capabilities but in its democratic vibrancy, its technological prowess, and its web of partnerships.

The contest over Taiwan is not merely territorial; it is a struggle between coercion and resilience, between an authoritarian vision of unity and a democratic determination to endure. For the CCP, Taiwan represents the unfinished chapter of China’s rise. For the people of Taiwan, it is home, a vibrant, self-governing society determined to chart its own course. The Indo-Pacific’s future hinges on which vision prevails.

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