Australia needs to coordinate national digital infrastructure investment and resilience or risk falling behind in security and missing economic opportunities.
For the past decade, Australia has focused outward on projects such as funding regional telecommunications infrastructure and infrastructure protection initiatives, while neglecting to coordinate such development at home.
This gap is especially visible in the case of the management and protection of Australia’s subsea cables.
Such cables carry nearly all of Australia’s international data traffic, and a simultaneous break across several cables on either side of the country would cause great disruption. Yet, despite rising digital dependence and a worsening threat environment, no new cable protection zones have been created. Consequently, companies laying many newer cables have squeezed them into existing protection zones, increasing the risk that a single incident—such as a dragged anchor—could take out several cables at once.
The Australian Communications and Media Authority is consulting on a proposed expansion of the Southern Sydney Submarine Cable Protection Zone. The update was initiated by a cable owner, Google subsidiary Perch Infrastructure, seeking coverage for its planned Tabua cable. If approved, this would be the first update of Australia’s cable protection zones since they were established nearly two decades ago.
The submarine cables industry has well regarded Australia’s cable protection regime for criminalisation of damage to cables and the ease of access to repair cables. While our regime is still held in high regard, we are no longer in an era where regulatory leadership alone can shield our digital backbone. We are in an era of intensifying geopolitical tension and environmental risk. If the proposed protection zone expansion is approved, Australia’s cable infrastructure will become marginally more resilient. But resilience built one cable at a time is not a strategy.
Submarine cables are infrastructure assets that carry enormous strategic and economic value. They enable digital trade, cloud services and artificial intelligence—sectors essential to Australia’s global competitiveness. They are also increasingly being seen as targets of economic warfare. If Australia wants to position itself as a regional digital hub and attract the investments and jobs that come with them, it must treat connectivity as a national economic priority. When the goal is to drive economic benefit from telecommunications, security becomes a necessary enabler.
Right now, that’s difficult for Australia to achieve, as governance is fragmented across multiple departments and levels of government with no single body responsible for aligning economic, security and infrastructure objectives.
Digital economy sits within the Industry, Science and Resources portfolio. The Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, framed as part of Australia’s contribution to the Quad, focuses outwards on regional engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Home Affairs oversees critical infrastructure security under the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 but is not assigned a broader coordination role. And the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts is domestically focused on communications and infrastructure but appears under-resourced to lead a national telecommunications resilience agenda. Its current focus remains disaster resilience.
Notably, sub-federal entities such as the Northern Territory government and Sunshine Coast Council are pursuing an economic agenda. Subsea cables and data centres, for example, form part of the Sunshine Coast’s regional economic development strategy that aims drive a $33 billion regional economy by 2033. Australia needs a mechanism to align these efforts, set priorities and make decisions.
International submarine cables are only one part of the equation. Domestic connectivity is just as critical. Planning must consider not just where cables land, but how they connect across the country. That includes closing gaps in terrestrial fibre and ensuring the network is resilient and future-ready.
Data centres—now common subsea cable landing destinations—must be integrated into national infrastructure planning. Data centre operators will build their hyperscale facilities near cables landing points. Government should incentivise the use of renewable energy to power and cool these energy-intensive facilities. At the same time, we need to train and grow the workforce required to build and manage this infrastructure.
Without a unified approach that connects submarine cable protection to terrestrial fibre, power, cooling and workforce planning, we risk compounding vulnerabilities and missing economic growth opportunities.
The lack of government funding for a branch cable that would connect Tasmania to the planned commercial SMAP cable linking Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth reflects a failure to prioritise nationally-significant digital infrastructure. Without forward planning and coordination, more opportunities will be missed.
The current consultation process should prompt more than redrawn boundary lines. It should trigger a national conversation about digital resilience, economic opportunity and coordinated government action. Without national coordination, we are not prepared for a major telecommunications disruption and risk squandering the economic opportunities that come with being a digital technology hub.
Without coordinated leadership, we risk both greater vulnerability and lost economic opportunity. Australia needs a national plan that defines objectives, sets priorities and gives one agency the mandate to lead.