Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s decisive victory in Japan’s 8 February lower-house election will be a game-changer for the Indo-Pacific security landscape. Armed with a supermajority (holding more than two thirds) in the House of Representatives, Takaichi’s government will likely use its political strength to bolster Japan militarily and diplomatically as it continues to stare down Chinese intimidation and economic coercion.

Before the election, Takaichi had already brought forward plans to double defence spending to 2 percent of GDP. This hardening of defence posture, considering China’s coercive actions in the East China Sea and beyond, will provide Japan with greater deterrence capabilities and signal to others in the region a willingness to share the security burden.

In another effort to shake Japan’s post-war pacifist character, Takaichi has committed to constitutional revision. Article 9, which renounces war and constrains the use of military force, is in her sights. This would align the law with Japan’s security reality.

This may be tricky. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both houses. Despite the results in the lower house, Takaichi’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party, holds a minority in the upper house, which is elected and has real veto power. However, it would be politically extraordinary if the upper house resisted the clear mandate Takaichi received from the public.

Beyond this, Takaichi’s commitment to establish a national intelligence agency is another step towards centralising Japan’s fragmented intelligence systems. Such an agency would enhance Tokyo’s ability to detect and respond to grey-zone threats, including cyberattacks and sabotage of supply chains or critical infrastructure.

By pairing military and security capabilities with institutional reform, Japan is positioning itself as a central pillar of regional balancing. Recent deals with the United States, including on critical minerals, will benefit Japan’s defence industrial base while also assisting both countries’ efforts to diversify from China. Not only does this enhance supply-chain resilience, it also deepens cooperation on shared national security objectives.

Taken together, this policy agenda will advance the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ concept by maintaining a maritime rules-based order and strengthening deterrence and resilience. A more capable Japan raises the costs of China’s coercion and reinforces balance along the western Pacific. For that reason, Takaichi’s victory should be celebrated not only domestically, but across the Indo-Pacific.