Let’s not get too gloomy. Despite their extensive modernisation, the Chinese armed forces still don’t have the capabilities needed for amphibious assault of Taiwan, particularly in the context of potential US intervention and Taiwan’s progressive adoption of asymmetric defence.
Numerous credible evaluations find that China lacks the requisite logistics, leadership and experience to conduct a comprehensive amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait. And Taiwan is adopting at least some elements of a porcupine strategy, one using numerous small weapons that China would have trouble in countering.
A Pentagon assessment in December 2024 revealed that extensive corruption within the Chinese military was compromising its ability to be ready to invade Taiwan in 2027—readiness that US officials say President Xi Jinping has demanded. In December 2024, open-intelligence service Janes assessed that the chance of China initiating a full-scale invasion in the next six to 12 months was just 5 percent. Janes expected that China’s military operations in 2024 would be mainly confined to intimidation and coercion rather than preparations for an offensive.
A survey in 2024 conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that only 27 percent of US experts and just 17 percent of Taiwanese experts believed that China had the capabilities to execute an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Another survey, by National Defense University in 2022, underscored that, though the Chinese armed forces had achieved impressive modernisation, they particularly lacked logistics integration and joint-force training needed for an invasion.
The impressive expansion in Chinese naval shipbuilding and the induction of advanced amphibious equipment, such as landing barges, are aimed at closing capability gaps. But analysts still see performance of the landing as extremely difficult, in part due to Taiwan’s geography.
The island’s western shores, where landings might occur, are exposed to defensive fire and surveillance and are approached by shallow water. The strait, at least 130 km wide, is often rough.
Taiwan defence preparations have visibly intensified. In a recent military drill in July, which engaged 22,000 reserve personnel-among the largest such mobilisations, Taiwan showcased newly acquired US-supplied Abrams M1A2T tanks and Himars rocket launcher vehicles, alongside cyber-defence simulations. This reflects not just routine equipment renewal but a deliberate move toward multi-domain preparedness.
We see some elements of a porcupine strategy in Taiwan. Examples are accelerated acquisition of sea mines and ground-launched anti-ship missiles, and arrangements for decentralised command.
But Taiwan also persists with high-value equipment, such as upgraded F-16s and large warships. While Taiwan’s armed forces are evidently evolving towards a porcupine strategy, they are still far from fully committed to one.
If invasion is impossible, Beijing has the alternatives of trying to force capitulation by blockading the island, bombarding it from the air or doing both. But these tactics would bring risk of international escalation. Prolongation of such tactics would likely invite an international response, especially from the United States.
While Taiwan’s chipmaking industry is the main feature of the island’s silicon shield—the industry whose global importance deters China from attacking. Chinese seizure of Taiwan would not guarantee control over these capabilities, and their destruction would trigger massive economic fallout.
The status quo continues to receive quiet but firm international backing. The US maintains unofficial but deep economic and military ties with Taiwan though the Taiwan Relations Act. Arms shipments have recently increased, and the US Congress has intensified support, mitigating concerns about President Donald Trump’s possibly transactional approach to Taiwan.
Taiwan’s friends must take notice of China’s goals, ambitions and increasing militarisation, but we must not overplay the threat.