Australia’s eastern maritime approaches haven’t got much attention since World War II. Defence policy has tended to look northwards and westwards.
So, too, do the three great Jindalee over-the-horizon radars that we have deep inland. But this year the Chinese navy, sailing down the coast of Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, has shown us that we need to widen that radar vision eastwards.
The three radars, forming Jindalee Over-the-horizon Radar Network (JORN), have been the backbone of Australia’s long-range surveillance capabilities for decades. They bounce high-frequency radio off the ionosphere to detect air and surface targets thousands of kilometres away, targets conventional radars cannot see due to the curvature of the earth.
JORN has performed admirably in detecting military targets, tracking smuggling routes and safeguarding Australian interests across the northern expanse. The radar at Laverton, Western Australia, looks westwards and northwards. Those at Alice Springs, Northern Territory, and Longreach, Queensland, look northwards.
So none could monitor the Chinese surface action group as it moved down the east coast (nor, for that matter, when it sailed across the Great Australian Bight in the south). The Australian Defence Force had to commit expensive physical assets to watch it. That experience suggests a compelling case for building an east-looking radar.
The idea has come up before—and apparently died. The previous, Liberal-National government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update said JORN would be adapted to monitor Australia’s eastward approaches. But neither the 2024 National Defence Strategy nor the associated spending outline, the Integrated Investment Plan, mentions this initiative. It seems to have been dropped.
The strategic context for Australia has changed dramatically over the past decade, driven by intensifying great power competition, assertive military posturing and shifts in influence across the Indo-Pacific. The South Pacific, once considered a geographic buffer, is now an active and contested domain, politically, militarily and economically.
China’s growing presence in the South Pacific is no longer a matter of speculation. Through infrastructure investment, loan diplomacy and bilateral security agreements, Beijing has secured influence across key island nations. Warship visits to ports in Samoa, Solomons, and Tonga have increased, serving as strategic signalling to both Australia and the United States. This reminds us of Japan’s 1942 Operation FS, which sought to isolate Australia by securing control over island chains along key transit routes.
Undersea cable networks linking Australia to North America, New Zealand and regional partners also traverse these waters. Among the information they carry is financial, diplomatic and military communication. Their disruption would paralyse national decision-making and blind Defence systems that rely on secure, high-bandwidth transmission. Yet no coherent surveillance capability persistently and closely monitors them.
Air-surveillance radar aircraft, such as Boeing E-7A Wedgetails, are increasingly threatened by stealthy fighters that can get close to them and by long-range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. China has developed such weapons. The shooting down of Russian air-surveillance aircraft, A-50s, shows they are vulnerable even in moderately contested airspace.
A ground-based, over-the-horizon radar is a resilient complement in ensuring constant surveillance in denied environments.
In this strategic atmosphere, persistent surveillance acts is more than a sensor; it also serves as a deterrent. An eastwards-looking radar—call it JORN East—would be visible and acknowledged, projecting resolve and technical capability to allies and adversaries alike.
Many battles have shown how surveillance and intelligence creates opportunities to put the right forces in the right place and win, even when overmatched by superior enemy. One was the Battle of Midway in 1942.
With finite ADF assets and a sprawling strategic environment, intelligence-driven cueing through persistent sensors like JORN East becomes essential for timely intervention and economy of force.
In the Cold War, over-the-horizon radars such as the Soviet Duga and Anglo-US Cobra Mist weren’t just about tracking; they also expressed national will. Such radars send a clear message: ‘We see you coming, and we’re prepared.’ A JORN East would signal Australian resolve and underscore our readiness to act in the Pacific.
Australia can no longer afford an asymmetric view of its strategic environment. Building a JORN East would align Defence surveillance with contemporary threats, amplify deterrence, and help secure critical infrastructure across the eastern seaboard and South Pacific.
The 2026 National Defence Strategy update presents a timely opportunity to commit to this initiative and safeguard the nation against emerging, multi-vector threats. Inclusion of a JORN East in the update would signal a more holistic and assertive posture, one that is informed by historical precedent, shaped by contemporary threats and built for future resilience.