Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol, the world’s premier platform for law enforcement, runs counter to international policing efforts. Taiwan’s ports, airlines and banking system are already prime targets for organised crime. Its geographic position makes it a hub for drug trafficking routes and illicit financial flows. Excluding its police from the most important cooperative mechanisms hampers real-time intelligence sharing, delays the identification of fugitives, and limits the scope of coordinated disruption operations. Criminal networks thrive in precisely these seams.
From 1 to 3 September, senior law enforcement officials from around the world gathered in Taipei for the 2025 International Forum on Policing Cooperation to Combat Transnational Organised Crime. Delegations from Australia, the United States, Britain and various regional partners joined Taiwan’s police to exchange intelligence, refine disruption strategies and explore how innovation can be leveraged against increasingly agile organised crime groups.
The conversations were rich, the networking was genuine and the themes were unmistakable: you need a network to defeat a network; disruption matters more than raw arrest numbers; and innovation is the key to keeping pace.
These are hardly new insights. Since the end of the Cold War, policing has become a fundamentally global enterprise. Cocaine, fentanyl, methamphetamines, cybercrime, child exploitation, money laundering and wildlife trafficking are all driven by transnational criminal markets. No single police agency, however well-resourced, can meet these challenges alone. Shared intelligence, joint operations, common disruption frameworks and trust are essential.
Yet Taiwan, one of the most capable and committed policing partners in the Indo-Pacific, remains systematically excluded from Interpol. The irony was evident in Taipei last week. Even as global officials worked alongside their Taiwanese counterparts, everyone knew that at the Interpol General Assembly—to be held in Morocco in late 2025—Taiwan wouldn’t even be allowed in the room. Reports suggest that Taiwanese police will struggle even to secure visas for meetings on the margins. More than diplomatic pettiness, this is a strategic liability.
The metaphor of ‘network versus network’ dominated the Taipei forum. Organised crime syndicates are nimble, transnational and structurally designed to exploit borders. Law enforcement must respond in kind, through dense webs of cooperation built on trust and routine information sharing.
Denying Taiwan a seat at Interpol undermines that very logic. Taiwan’s absence does not just harm Taipei; it leaves gaps in the global policing web.
At the Taipei forum, participants emphasised that metrics for success must go beyond the number of arrests or seizures. Disruption, breaking supply chains, targeting financial lifelines, and undermining recruitment and logistics are what matter. These require timely intelligence, rapid operational collaboration and innovative methods. Here, too, Taiwan has proven itself a valuable contributor: its cybercrime units are respected across the region for their technical skill; its financial intelligence analysts have helped uncover sophisticated laundering schemes; and its police have quietly but effectively supported regional counter-drug operations. But without access to Interpol’s databases, communication channels and coordination forums, Taiwan’s contributions are throttled. That hurts everyone, including Australia.
Interpol was never intended to be a political organisation. Its constitution enshrines a principle of neutrality, with no political, military, religious or racial interventions. In practice, however, geopolitical realities have bent the institution. Beijing has consistently lobbied to exclude Taiwan, framing its police as illegitimate. The result is a self-defeating contradiction: Interpol, an organisation created to ensure no jurisdiction becomes a safe haven for criminals, is knowingly creating blind spots in its own network. The exclusion of Taiwan is not just unfair; it is strategically dangerous. Organised crime groups are not interested in the niceties of state recognition. They are interested in the seams, the gaps, the places where enforcement is weakest. By leaving Taiwan outside the circle, Interpol is providing exactly that.
The upcoming Interpol General Assembly should be an opportunity for quiet progress. At a minimum, Taiwan should be allowed to host bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the summit. Instead, reports suggest that even that will be denied, as Moroccan visas may not be forthcoming. This makes a mockery of Interpol’s supposed neutrality. It is hard to imagine a clearer signal to organised crime groups that political considerations matter more than operational effectiveness.
We can do better. We must do better. That begins with acknowledging the professional competence and proven track record of Taiwan’s police. The Taipei forum demonstrated what is possible when law enforcement agencies work pragmatically across borders. Those officials who attended know the value Taiwan brings. The challenge now is to carry that honesty into global fora.
Australia, the US, Britain and other like-minded partners should not shy away from making the case for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in Interpol. Observer status, as I have argued in a previous Strategist piece, would be a practical compromise—a means to enhance global policing without prejudicing political disputes. At the very least, Taiwan’s police need access to core databases and coordination channels.
The fight against organised crime is a global one. It requires disruption-focused strategies, constant innovation and networks of trust. Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol weakens all three of these. The Taipei forum was a reminder of both Taiwan’s potential and the costs of sidelining it. If we’re serious about defeating transnational organised crime, we need every capable partner at the table.