The Japanese public’s strong confidence in their new—and first female—prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, gives her government a window to strengthen Japan’s approach to hybrid threats. To do so, her government could draw on Australia’s experience in confronting information warfare, election interference and covert foreign influence.
The Takaichi government has enjoyed high approval ratings, ranging between 71 and 82 percent, suggesting the public is looking to her for decisive leadership. Influenced by former prime minister Shinzo Abe and former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, Takaichi is known for firm patriotic positions, including efforts to amend Japan’s penal code to introduce new penalties for vandalising the national flag.
Under former prime minister Shigeru Ishiba, Japan began strengthening its response to hybrid threats by tasking the deputy chief cabinet secretary with coordinating the detection, analysis and response to disinformation and election interference. The structure, rolled out in September, enabled relevant ministries to work together to combat disinformation, centralised under the direction of the Cabinet Secretariat. This approach somewhat mirrors Australia’s model, combining the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce, which tracks and publicly reports on election-related disinformation through its disinformation register, and the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator and Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre.
Like other democracies, Japan particularly grapples with disinformation during elections, when false narratives can influence voter behaviour. For example, the Japan Fact-Checking Center has particularly observed misleading and fabricated online content in the 2024 Hyogo governor and 2025 Upper House election campaigns. At the same time, confidence in traditional media has declined among both younger citizens and, more recently, elderly generations. Social media has therefore become a primary arena for forming political opinions and influencing voting decisions, while simultaneously amplifying both legitimate democratic debate and disinformation.
In an August interview with Nikkei, Takaichi noted that no law comprehensively prohibited foreign powers’ espionage in Japan. She called for legalisation that would clearly define espionage activities, establish investigative procedures and set out mechanisms for cooperation and custody exchanges with foreign governments. She is also leading efforts to establish a new national intelligence bureau to serve as a central hub for collecting and analysing intelligence from domestic and international sources.
Takaichi is further advocating for the creation of a dedicated signals intelligence agency and for legal authority to intercept communications, arguing that Japan needs these tools to detect and counter attempts by foreign powers to manipulate public opinion, influence election outcomes, sow domestic division or damage Japan’s international relationships.
China’s multi-faceted interference in Taiwan has demonstrated how hybrid threats can raise regional tensions. For Japan, developments in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula are intimately linked to its domestic security, underscoring the need for a system that can rapidly detect, identify, warn of and respond to such activities.
Australia’s experience offers Japan a useful blueprint for building a coordinated system to counter hybrid threats. At the centre of Australia’s approach is the National Intelligence Community—a network of agencies that cooperate through shared data and threat assessments, and coordinated operational planning to protect national security, prosperity and sovereignty. Key members include the Australian Federal Police, Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and Office of National Intelligence. Each plays a distinct role, including investigating and disrupting foreign interference, collecting and analysing intelligence, and providing strategic assessments to government.
ASIO’s director general has frequently issued public warnings about the scale and sophistication of foreign interference targeting Australia. ASD’s former director general has also issued such warnings. This transparency has helped raise public awareness and build social resilience. Although Japan’s cabinet website issues information on foreign disinformation, it could adapt some of Australia’s other transparency measures. In parallel, the Australian Defence Force has begun integrating cognitive-warfare considerations into its planning, recognising that strategic competition increasingly hinges on perceptions, information flows and public trust.
Critically, Australia has also equipped its agencies with modern legal tools. For example, the 2018 Espionage and Foreign Interference Act established comprehensive offences for covert foreign interference. The broader legal framework gives agencies clear authority to disrupt, deter and prosecute malign activity. Japanese agencies lack such authority. Australia is also extending some security agency powers to a more comprehensive range of security threats, including such hybrid threats as sabotage and attacks on defence systems.
Australia’s integrated institutional architecture, public transparency practices and modernised legal framework together offer a template for Japan to build a more resilient posture against hybrid threats.
Australian efforts to address malign overt foreign influence have had more mixed results but also present lessons for Japan. The 2018 Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme—which requires registration by those representing foreign interests—has been criticised for being unfocused and threat-agnostic. And a review of the Foreign Arrangements Scheme—which requires subnational entities to notify the foreign minister of international agreements—recommended a sharper focus and less unnecessary bureaucracy.
Sharpening geostrategic competition and public popularity present Takaichi with an opportunity to reshape Japan’s posture and elevate its intelligence and security architecture to address hybrid threats. By drawing on lessons from Australia, Takaichi could strengthen Japan’s resilience, close long-standing legal and institutional gaps and build a more coordinated national response to foreign interference and information warfare. Success would enhance Japan’s own security, deepen Australia–Japan cooperation, and reinforce Tokyo’s role in a region facing the same challenges.