The announcement of an upgrade of the Australia-France Roadmap confirms that both countries are moving forward shoulder-to-shoulder in the global scrum. As Canberra and Paris strengthen their partnership and move past mutual misunderstandings, and as Australian and French interests increasingly converge, the time is ripe for such an upgrade.
This upgrade, announced on 9 June, was perhaps inevitable given the two countries’ burgeoning doctrinal convergence. Australia and France increasingly identify the same strategic challenges, similar ways to address them and a desire to adopt cooperative approaches to navigating them.
The challenge now is to translate that convergence into action. The final roadmap should set the stage for cooperation in areas that have thus far received less attention, including defence industry, the Western Indian Ocean, space security and overlapping interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. It may also be time to revitalise and upgrade the Paris–New Delhi–Canberra Trilateral Dialogue by giving it a greater strategic purpose. Over time, this path could lead to opportunities with Indonesia and Canada, building on the existing network of partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.
The inaugural Australia-France Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations in August 2021 were followed less than three weeks later by the cancellation of the two countries’ submarines contract. But in 2023, the second consultations produced an opportune roadmap. This document, the first pillar of which touched on defence and security, marked a new chapter in the bilateral relationship.
Now, it is reasonable for Australia and France to shift up a gear through the forthcoming upgrade.
First, the global context is much more demanding, given ongoing crises in the Middle East, China’s continued rise, and uncertainty in the White House.
Second, there is a solid foundation in France to build on, as Australia’s cancellation of its Attack-class submarine contract belongs to the past. In addition, compared with the usual fault lines across the domestic scene, there is general consensus in France around the current US administration’s campaigns (for example in Venezuela, Greenland, Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine). Moreover, the focuses of France’s diplomatic doctrine have been mostly consistent: preservation of the rules-based order, independence from great powers and faith in Europe. Considering this, combined with France’s territorial interests in the region, Australia can take Paris seriously when it says it will work ‘for a peaceful, stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific region, which remains open and inclusive,’ as the joint statement explained.
Third, Canberra and Paris can point to successes in the defence pillar of their 2023 roadmap. Strategic dialogues and stronger participation in both Australia-led and France-led exercises (such as June’s Marara 26) have helped ‘deepen military interoperability through more complex joint activities’ and ‘increase intelligence sharing to strengthen our mutual understanding.’ This pillar has clearly not been ignored. This is a positive sign.
Beyond these developments, there are some geopolitical opportunities to seize.
Both Australia and France promote interconnection between European and Indo-Pacific theatres, particularly East Asia. French President Emmanuel Macron has been more vocal on China, as demonstrated through comments made at the 2026 Munich Security Conference and G7 regarding arms control, trade imbalance, support for Russia and social media algorithms. Australia is participating in the Coalition of the Willing to support Ukraine and signed a Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union (EU) in March. More generally, both countries continue to promote multilateralism and international law in opposition to revisionist powers.
Australian and French doctrinal trends are also converging rather than drifting apart. Paris may have irritated Canberra and other partners when it continued to promote the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’. However, after Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s March visit to Canberra, Australia advocated for ‘a world governed by rights and rules, not fear or force’ in a joint statement. One month later, the Australia’s National Defence Strategy (NDS) revived the idea of self-reliance, which had been de-emphasised over the past decade. References to diplomatic and supply-chain diversifications in Penny Wong’s statements confirm this strategic alignment.
That said, to gain credibility, Australia and France need to work on more concrete projects. Analysts might question France’s capabilities in the Pacific despite its annual Marara-Croix-du-Sud humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises and regular deployments, which include Rafale jets, carrier battle groups and helicopter carriers. Similarly, NDS readers might see Australia primarily as a Northeastern Indian Ocean power despite, for example, its initiatives in and with the United Arab Emirates.
The partnership should therefore offer more in terms of cooperation in various fields. Both countries’ foreign ministers have already raised collaboration in critical minerals and national security, specifically countering cybercrime and drug trafficking. Further cooperation could be pursued in Antarctica-related issues, including space domain awareness; maritime security, possibly through the EU OceanEye initiative or the France-led Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center; and the defence industry, particularly given French companies such as Safran, MBDA and Thales maintain a significant presence in Australia.
The two countries are also well placed to strengthen joint counter-disinformation efforts. For example, in early June, French government agency Viginum uncovered a network of propaganda sites linked to China. As well as this, such joint efforts could build on existing EU–Australia efforts against hybrid threats. Australia could also support France’s training operations through the Pacific Academy, similar to those provided to Kiribati in April.
As July’s rugby union test match will demonstrate, Australians and the French are always happy to gather after a clash on the pitch. The same is true in business. It’s time for a diplomatic post-match meeting, maybe with new players such as India, Indonesia and Canada, the latter of which attended April’s European Political Community meeting. The more the merrier – and hopefully, the greater the deterrent effect.