The Australian government’s dispute with the United States over the level of defence spending has distracted our media and public from the core issue. The main driver of increased defence spending should not be requests from US officials but the Australian government’s determination to prepare the nation properly for the much more dangerous security challenges we now face.

Australia is confronted by a powerful, expansionist and confident China that is already working to undermine our security through cyber intrusions, espionage and other means. Meanwhile, we are partnered with a different US that, while striving to rebuild its military and supporting industrial capabilities, is becoming a less predictable and reliable ally.

Tensions have escalated between China on the one hand and the US and most of its allies on the other. There are serious differences over the future of Taiwan, the South China Sea, economic and technological competition and great power pre-eminence in the Western Pacific. The risk of conflict in our region has risen markedly, generating the most serious deterioration in Australia’s security outlook since World War II.

While the government accepts that the country is in a more perilous situation, it is not discussing the causes of our weakening security or the need for urgent action. It is deferring serious strengthening of our defences while the tectonic plates of our security are shifting beneath our feet.

This is dangerous. The drivers of our changing security situation have powerful consequences, they are largely beyond our control, and most are likely to be enduring. Turning a blind eye and continuing as though nothing important has changed is rendering Australia very vulnerable.

One of the main changes in our security outlook is that the primary battlefields of prospective major wars are much closer to Australia than before. During the Cold War, the centre of global power and potential major conflict was in Europe; Australia was in a strategic backwater. But now we are on the edge of the most fiercely contested region on the globe, we are enmeshed in the most likely theatre of major power war and, if we face such a crisis, we will probably be attacked at an early stage. We can expect air and missile strikes, attacks on key military bases and shipping, mining of some ports, special force raids, sabotage and powerful, disabling cyberattacks. We should expect human and system losses, major disruptions to the economy and attempts to cower us into submission.

We have not had to deal with this type of threat since the threat of Japanese attack arose in the late 1930s.

Undertaking and sustaining combat operations in our immediate region would require more extensive preparations by Defence. But many other departments, businesses and community organisations will also need to be involved. A whole-of-nation effort would be required.

Australia is not prepared for this very different type of crisis.

A second major change is that the US’ military power is no longer overwhelming. At about 3.3 percent of GDP, US defence spending is close to its lowest share of the economy in 70 years. Until recent months, the defence spending of most of Australia’s other allies has been even lower, at 2 percent of GDP or less. This US and allied weakness is undermining deterrence of Chinese and Russian expansionism and reducing the capabilities of allies to assist us in a crisis.

A third important change that is undermining our security is the shifting balance of forces between the US, Russia and China in the nuclear domain. China is rapidly expanding its strategic nuclear forces, and the Pentagon has warned that within a decade China may have the same number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads as each of the US and Russia. This means that, if current trends continue, Washington will likely be outgunned in a future crisis, because it will be confronted by a coalition of two authoritarian opponents possessing a total of 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads, about twice as many as the US.

That is why the Trump administration is not only modernising the US nuclear arsenal; it is also preparing a rapid expansion. China’s fast growing nuclear force has also spurred Trump’s urgent deployment of the Golden Dome defence system, to protect the American homeland from missile attacks.

These US initiatives should enhance allied deterrence and limit Australian vulnerability to nuclear coercion. Moreover, because Golden Dome will be mostly space-based, there may be scope to expand its missile-defence coverage to Australia and other parts of the Western Pacific if we and our allies on this side of the world are prepared to pay.

Australia has another strong interest in these issues. If nuclear superiority is ceded to Moscow and Beijing, the US and its allies will lose escalation dominance in future crises. This is already a problem, because Beijing and Moscow are increasingly exploiting their rising strategic power by launching more aggressive conventional operations in the South China Sea, waters around Taiwan and Japan, and in Ukraine and elsewhere. Beijing and Moscow realise that, in contrast to the past, Washington is now more constrained in its options for confronting them and defending its allies and friends.

Another major driver of increased Australian defence investment is that the industrial capabilities of the US and most of its allies, globally dominant 30 years ago, are now overshadowed by those of China. The manufacturing output of China is now double that of the US, and its shipbuilding capacity is more than 100 times as big. In a major war the weakened industrial capabilities of the US and most of its partners will be a serious constraint on allied options. The US will struggle to supply its own forces. Many allies, including Australia, will need to make more of their own defence equipment, spare parts and other supplies or find other, trusted sources. This will be critical to the outcome of a future conflict, especially if the war is prolonged.

Then there is declining US support for the commitment of US forces for defence of allies and security partners. Since the Vietnam War, the US public has been increasingly unwilling to sustain major military operations abroad and accept casualties for an extended period unless the US itself is directly threatened.

We also see declining US strategic credibility, another reason for Australia to push up its defence spending. This change is largely a consequence of the inconsistent and sometimes insincere behaviour of recent presidents in managing international relationships. Since the 1990s, most US presidents have appeared less strategic in focus, concerned less about allied teaming and more about narrow US political interests.

For instance, president Barack Obama said in 2012 that Syrian use of chemical weapons would cross a US red line, and the Syrians used them almost immediately. Obama did virtually nothing. Similarly, Chinese President Xi Jinping assured Obama to his face in 2015 that he had no intention to militarise the South China Sea, but it was soon revealed that construction of military facilities was already underway. Obama’s response was exceptionally mild. His instinct was to avoid a confrontation with Beijing at all costs rather than defend the maritime interests of the US and its security partners. It is especially notable that Obama had little interest in confronting Xi Jinping over the territorial integrity of the Philippines, a long-standing treaty ally.

Then, in the past two years, presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump have both interfered in the campaigns of self-defence fought by Israel and Ukraine. Under both presidents the US has insisted on security partners accepting its directions, even if this has meant handing over national territory to an authoritarian invader or surrendering core interests to a terrorist group.

The lessons for Australia are stark. Prompt, powerful and sustained US support for Australia in a crisis is now much less predictable and less likely than it has been. Moreover, because many of the changes we are seeing pre-date Trump’s re-election and reflect deeper social and political changes in the US, they are likely to be enduring.

Another driver of increased Australian defence spending is China’s determination to dominate the Indo-Pacific and eventually surpass the power of the United States.

It now has the largest army, navy, air force, coastguard and militia forces in the Western Pacific. It has also deployed the strongest medium-range missile, cyber, space and counter-space and information warfare capabilities in the theatre.

China’s preparations for major conflicts extend far beyond the military to involve many aspects of life in the country. The regime’s infrastructure development programs now give equal, and sometimes higher, priority to security and defence needs over economic growth. Xi Jinping calls this ‘integrating national strategies and strategic capabilities.’ The economic cost of this resource redirection is huge, probably reducing China’s annual GDP growth by 1 to 2 percent.

Then there are the programs of bomb-shelter building and the adaption of industry for military support in crises. China is also rapidly expanding its strategic reserves of fuel, raw materials, food and other essential supplies.

Xi Jinping insists that all Chinese government agencies and indeed the entire nation prepare for the prospect of major war. He has ordered his National Security Commission to be ready for ‘dangerous storms’ and the ‘most extreme scenarios’.

A further driver for strengthened Australian defence is Xi’s high strategic confidence.  He likes to say is that ‘the East is rising and the West is declining’. Two months ago, he re-stated his determination to seize the vibrant democracy of 24 million people on Taiwan: ‘No matter how the situation on the Taiwan island evolves or what troubles external forces may make, the historical trend toward China’s ultimate and inevitable reunification is unstoppable.’ Xi has ordered the Chinese military to be ready to conduct a major operation against Taiwan by 2027.

Another major change is that Xi Jinping is expanding China’s quasi alliances with Russia, North Korea, Iran and others. In a future crisis Australia and its allies may face combined operations from this larger authoritarian team.

Yet another reason for Australia to lift its game is that our country is already being subjected to intense Chinese and Russian cyber, espionage, political interference and coercion operations. We are also seeing more frequent military intrusions into our neighbourhood, and these are expected to increase.

My central point is that, in combination, these changes in Australia’s strategic circumstances represent a paradigm shift. It is no longer credible to argue that Australia will never be attacked by a major power and that in any future crisis we can rely on the US and other allies to spring quickly to our defence.

In consequence, our defence and security planners now have a very different and more demanding task. We must prepare to fight wars of necessity against a major authoritarian power in our immediate region. We may need to fight with little or no warning and we cannot be certain about the level and endurance of US and other allied support.

What should we do?  There are nine key priorities.

First, we must expand programs that foster closer US involvement in the defence of Australia and our region. If we can encourage the US and other allies to deter and fight with us as a coalition, this should always be our first choice.

Next, we cannot now exclude the possibility that in a future crisis the US may   choose to stand aloof or put conditions on its support that undermine our sovereignty. So a high priority should be given to acquiring a select range of independent capabilities that have powerful deterrent force and can stop an aggressive major power in its tracks. These systems should offer high leverage in changing an opponent’s strategic calculations, have long range, be very difficult for an opponent to counter, be affordable in scale and be produced domestically.

Candidate systems should include advanced uncrewed submarines, road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range uncrewed strike aircraft, advanced cyber capabilities and specialist facilities, similar to those in some NATO countries, designed to store allied tactical nuclear weapons in crises. These high-leverage capabilities should deliver very strong independent deterrence and defensive capabilities, but they should also be able to supplement allied forces powerfully in the event of a combined campaign. This two-track development of independent and alliance-related capabilities will be essential in the new era.

Third, we need hardening of our primary military bases and other strategic facilities.  Most of our combat aircraft are parked at a small number of air bases in the open or under what are accurately nicknamed carports. They are very vulnerable to missile, drone or saboteur attacks. Concrete shelters and other protective measures are needed urgently.

And, separate from our intimate security cooperation with the US, we need to work more closely with other security allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific—most notably Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea and India.

Australia also needs to take the economic and industrial dimensions of its security far more seriously. An early priority should be restoration of international competitiveness and investment attractiveness to our strategic industries. This will require everything from restoring the former cheapness of our energy supplies to dramatic reductions in red and green tape and introduction of an internationally competitive taxation regime.

Furthermore, Australia needs a strategy to deal with economic weaponisation, which globally has included increasingly frequent use of import bans, tariffs, supply chain manipulations and blockades. This has the potential to contribute substantially to deterrence and national resilience in many contingencies.

We also need to extend the emergency services and security organisations in each state and territory to train and equip personnel to provide effective civil defence in crises.

Another important priority is for the government to raise community awareness of defence and security issues. Ministers need to describe the types of security challenge we now face and why more effort is required. Citizens need to know how they can protect themselves and contribute to strengthening homeland resilience.

Finally, our politicians, our media and our civilian communities need to accept that effective defence and security in Australia’s new strategic circumstances cannot be delivered with the defence budget of 2 or 2.3 percent of GDP that the government plans for the coming decade. The new NATO standard of 3.5 percent of GDP for defence and 1.5 percent of GDP for supporting infrastructure should be enough for Australia to build a dramatically improved set of deterrence and defence capabilities.

The government has tried hard to ignore our increased security vulnerability to avoid keeping the public informed and to dismiss requests of our major ally to do more. The government is gambling that its minimalist defence spending will be enough. If it is wrong, Australia will pay a terrible price.