Among all the uncertainties of the Israel-Iran conflict, two things are clear: a nuclearised Iran is a threat to global security; and Tehran will not give up its nuclear program easily. What’s less clear is how to manage that threat. ASPI analysts offer their insights, discussing outlooks for diplomatic and military avenues to Iranian denuclearisation, and the roles of the United States and Australia in potential solutions.
David Wroe, resident senior fellow
This is a major test of Donald Trump’s mettle. Can he take this once-in-a-generation opportunity to solve one of the world’s most destabilising and intractable problems?
The possibility of Iran’s having the bomb is a perpetual storm cloud on the horizon, whether its nuclear breakout time is 18 months or 18 days. Dissecting variations in information across intelligence assessments, congressional statements and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports doesn’t change the fact that the region and world will be much safer if Tehran’s enrichment program is disabled.
Now is the chance and Trump must take it. Israel has degraded Iran’s military, leadership and air defences. Iran’s neutered proxies have barely made a peep in its defence. Neither Russia nor China is able or willing to step in to help its ‘axis of upheaval’ partner.
Either Tehran makes an ironclad promise to abandon its program, or the US strikes the key enrichment facility at Fordow and effectively ends the regime’s nuclear ambitions. Given the regime’s attachment to the program, Trump must be ready to take the military option.
Malcolm Davis, senior analyst
We are now facing the consequences of diplomatic solutions that leave Iran with its enrichment capability intact. Any outcome that allows Tehran to retain this capability will be unacceptable to Israel and should be unacceptable to the US. Fighting is the only option, with a priority being the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly the hardened and deeply buried site at Fordow.
Israel cannot destroy Fordow from the air. Other options, such as a special forces operations, would put personnel at enormous risk and are likely to fail. The US has a better chance with its GBU 57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator bomb, delivered by B-2A Spirit bombers. However, repeated attacks would be necessary, as a single strike would likely cause damage short of destruction.
The risks are clear. US intervention would certainly see retaliation, widening the war and potentially dragging the US into an unpredictable extended campaign. This would politically damage the Trump administration, already under pressure to turn away from international commitments.
But if Fordow survives, Iranian nuclear capabilities can be reconstituted. That outcome is unacceptable, and Trump may be forced to choose the least bad option: hitting Fordow now and hoping for a regime change in Iran.
Raji Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow
Iran has spent enormous economic and political resources on its nuclear capabilities, so it’s unlikely to voluntarily give them up. It has always insisted that enrichment is non-negotiable, and refused to give it up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Negotiation is unlikely to do much aside from potentially delaying a dash for nuclear weapons. But delays also allow Iran to build other elements of a weapons program, expand and assault-proof its nuclear installations and accumulate large quantities of enriched weapons-grade fissile material. At best, this simply kicks the can down the road. At worst, it leaves Iran with a latent nuclear capability.
A negotiated deal works only if Iran is prevented from accumulating enriched uranium, and the IAEA is given a full report of the country’s past activities, such as explosive testing. It seems unlikely that Tehran will agree to this.
Iran has got to this point by exploiting terms in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that provide for civilian nuclear programs, including enrichment and reprocessing. India followed the same path, but with the credible justification that it did not have domestic energy resources. Iran, in contrast, is oil rich.
Alex Bristow, senior analyst
Australia is unlikely to play a prominent role in any deal or US military action in Iran. Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong reminded the media of this on 19 June, repeating that ‘we are not a central player in the Middle East’. Even so, Australia’s diplomatic networks and technical non-proliferation capabilities could help prime or verify a deal.
Since joining the NPT in the 1970s, Australia has become a leading non-proliferation advocate. Successive foreign affairs ministers have helped develop international safeguards supplementing the NPT. They have also built networks, such as the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, to complement United Nations forums.
Australia abandoned its work on acquiring nuclear weapons upon joining the NPT, but deliberately maintained the skills and institutions required for nuclear research and the technical verification of non-proliferation agreements.
Wong could mobilise Australia’s networks to propose ways for technically capable countries to help verify a deal intended to put nuclear weapons beyond Iran’s reach. However, she would be wary of sidelining the IAEA, as maintaining its integrity is vital for developing safeguards to assure the world that AUKUS poses no proliferation risk.
Australia may never be a central player in delivering peace and security to the Middle East, but it has options to put on the table.