Australia’s approach to the Israel-Iran war has so far been based on a flawed model of statecraft. It’s one that tends to balkanise problems into convenient buckets, to be tackled piecemeal, rather than recognising the connections between them.

For instance, Canberra has emphasised dialogue and sanctions as the best approach to non-proliferation without addressing the risk that an Iranian regime with nuclear weapons could arm its terrorist proxies, including Hamas.

Since Israel’s strikes began on 13 June, Australian ministers have joined their Western counterparts in acknowledging the urgent threat of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Some, including Canada’s new prime minister, Mark Carney, have gone further by framing the Iranian threat in the context of Israel’s right to defend itself, without endorsing the pre-emptive use of force that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has chosen.

But this begs the question: why did warnings about Iran’s nuclear program only receive high-level political attention in Australia and elsewhere after Israel initiated its pre-emptive strikes? On 31 May, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had stockpiled enriched uranium at nearly the quality required for several nuclear weapons. This prompted a resolution by the IAEA board of governors on 12 June that Iran was in breach of its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations.

However, until 13 June, Australia’s public-facing diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East focused on pressuring Israel to return to the two-state solution; increasing aid to Gaza; and preparations for a now-postponed summit in New York, hosted by France and Saudi Arabia, which aimed to agree an irreversible roadmap to Palestinian statehood. Urgent measures to respond to Iran’s nuclear ambitions did not appear to be such a priority for most of the international community, including Australia, even if Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong may have discussed these issues privately with the Israeli ambassador in Canberra on 12 June.

Speaking to the media over the weekend, Wong said the threat posed by Iran was not in dispute, which was why it was already subject to sanctions, but that using force to respond risked escalation and dire consequences for the region. That is demonstrably true. Civilian casualties are mounting in Israel and Iran, and the conflict could expand if Iran attacks the US or others for contributing to Israel’s air defences.

Wong was also far from alone in fearing the consequences of Israel’s actions. For instance, the IAEA has also censured Israel for breaching multiple resolutions against the targeting of nuclear facilities, which risks the dispersal of radioactive material across Iran and neighbouring countries.

But the consequences we are now seeing must be weighed against the potential ramifications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, which might be even worse. Jews have learned to take the apocalyptic rantings of tyrants at face value, and the Iranian regime, Hamas and other Iran-backed terrorist groups have repeatedly stated their aim to destroy Israel. Although Israel possesses its own undeclared stockpile of nuclear weapons, it’s not clear that these would deter such a multi-faceted threat, especially as some extremists may welcome nuclear war.

Before advocating for de-escalation and diplomatic solutions, Australian ministers and their peers must assess why diplomacy and non-military forms of pressure, such as sanctions, would work now, when Iran has hoodwinked the international community for so long. One possible answer, and one that US President Donald Trump seems inclined towards, is that Iran’s autocratic leaders respect strength and only now understand that their survival depends on upholding the terms of a deal.

While the G7 summit this week is an opportunity to seek some level of consensus, acting in good company does not make up for disjointed statecraft. Before this conflict, Australia stood with most of the world in advocating for an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza and an irreversible roadmap to Palestinian statehood. However, the Australian government has never explained how Hamas and its Iranian backers would be excluded from power, how hostages would be returned or how Israel would be left secure following a ceasefire. In the same light, tackling Iran’s bomb program should be an essential waypoint in any roadmap towards a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians.

Failure to join the dots in the Middle East would have implications closer to home. Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States—the Quad—had a phone call to reaffirm their commitment to an Indo-Pacific where territorial integrity is respected. This was a warning to Beijing against opportunism.

With Beijing monitoring whether the US is about to be pulled into another major war, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should encourage the G7 to affirm the democracies’ collective resolve to contain or rollback authoritarian adventurism. By making such connections in Calgary this week, Albanese would be helping to fix the flaws in Australian statecraft.

This article has been corrected to remove an incorrect reference to the IAEA reporting that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons program.