The long-awaited Australia-Vanuatu Nakamal Agreement (Nakamal) gives Canberra something useful, but it doesn’t appear to be the deal Australia was initially seeking. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and ni-Vanuatu Prime minister Jotham Napat signed the security pact on Monday, 10 months after Vanuatu’s government withdrew from signing the deal due to concerns around sovereignty.
The since-renegotiated pact seeks to confirm Australia as Vanuatu’s primary defence and security partner amid China’s intense efforts to supplant Australia’s long-held role in the region. It is the latest in a line of similar deals Australia has pursued with other Pacific states, including Nauru, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea and Fiji.
It’s likely that the initial version of Nakamal, like some of Australia’s other Pacific agreements, sought to give Australia a functional veto over third-party investment in security-related infrastructure. However, the precise details of this initial version were never made public.
What we do know is that Albanese travelled to Port Vila to sign the deal last year and returned empty-handed. Napat said his government’s reluctance to sign was due to last-minute concerns regarding the ‘wording’ of the clause referencing third-party investment in critical infrastructure. Napat said that the clause could limit Vanuatu’s engagement with international partners, leading to fears that the deal would require Vanuatu to surrender sovereignty to Australia. The abrupt interruption in what many thought was a finished process was peculiar.
The Australian government has said it is in a state of ‘permanent contest’ with China in the Pacific, which helps explain Vanuatu’s last-minute hesitancy. While Australia and Vanuatu deliberated, China undertook a spending spree in Vanuatu, notably committing A$86 million in upgrades to government buildings – China’s biggest single money transfer to Vanuatu. This came amid a litany of other financial commitments, including the provision of policing equipment. While Australia was negotiating the pact, China’s own Namele Agreement with Vanuatu came to light. While details remain scarce, the treaty seems nominally aimed at development and strategic cooperation. One Australian official, however, told local press in Vanuatu that there were fears the deal would contain security elements. This allegation led to a rebuke from Napat.
In another twist, earlier this month, Australia removed Vanuatu from the list of countries eligible for the Pacific Engagement Visa, a coveted permanent residence scheme. Given that increased migratory pathways for its citizens were a major Vanuatuan negotiating goal, this development just weeks before the signing of a troubled security deal suggests there were further hiccups behind the scenes.
After a turbulent 10 months, Albanese and Napat signed a seemingly watered-down version of Nakamal. In place of the veto provisions expected in last year’s deal, Vanuatu agreed to consult Australia on third-party security deals involving critical infrastructure investment without a commitment to action. The deal nominally recognises Australia as Vanuatu’s primary policing partner and requires Vanuatu to prioritise Pacific Island Forum members when making policing requests.
However, this doesn’t prevent Vanuatu from cooperating with Chinese state police forces. Chinese police forces have grown increasingly active in recent years, providing training, equipment and a rotational contingent, which changed over just days before Nakamal was signed. Agreements with Nauru and Tuvalu gave Australia veto rights on those countries’ security arrangements with third parties, including on policing. It’s unreasonable to expect essentially the same deal with each partner state. But Canberra’s willingness to make undesirable concessions such as the looser policing commitments in Nakamal, particularly after a period of heightened Chinese efforts, exemplify the level of competition that Australia is facing in the region.
There are also clear wins from Nakamal. Vanuatu has agreed not to allow foreign military basing in its territory, realising a long-held Australian ambition. It further agreed to ‘differentiate citizenship by investment from other forms of citizenship’. Vanuatu’s citizenship by investment program essentially allows foreign nationals to purchase citizenship and by extension, obtain a Vanuatu passport. The program has long presented a security challenge for partner countries, as it may facilitate the entry of bad actors on Vanuatu passports.
The agreement also opens formalised mechanisms for deeper cooperation on security issues including cyber, infrastructure, and intelligence, and streamlines Australia’s own trans-national policing efforts. While these commitments will help Australia remain a competitive partner, Nakamal commits only to intent where other Pacific deals commit to action. Even so, Nakamal was sufficient to garner a rebuke from China – a telltale sign that the agreement is on the right track.
Though some details are still unknown, it’s likely that the agreement signed on Monday is not the deal Australia thought it was just hours away from signing last September. However, Nakamal shows that Canberra can still shore up important commitments in the Pacific and deploy its middle-power capabilities against great-power attempts to undermine Australian interests. Strategic competition is alive and well in the Pacific, and Australia has again shown its mettle where it counts.