ASPI has wargamed President Xi Jinping’s options for subjugating Taiwan. We tried four scenarios, the details of which will be presented in this and three more daily articles this week.

Xi likely favours a path to unification in which Taiwan is gradually worn down by sustained and intensifying Chinese coercion. However, if he sought to accelerate this process, he would likely favour actions that remained below the threshold of war but still compelled Taiwan to cede aspects of its sovereignty. This could include the China Coast Guard enforcing a quarantine of Taiwan—asserting a right to block certain imports and exports— or covert acts of subversion intended to trigger a broader crisis and increase pressure on Taipei.

While more overt options, such as a full-scale invasion or naval blockade, remain possible, they carry significant risks that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power. As long as Xi views these risks as credible, actions that could rapidly escalate to war are unlikely to be his preferred course.

Xi has made his intentions regarding Taiwan clear. At the 20th Party Congress, he reiterated that, while peaceful unification was his preferred approach, China still reserved the right to use force if necessary. Although he has set no specific deadline, he warned in 2013 that the Taiwan issue ‘should not be passed down generation after generation.’ In his recent speeches, Xi continues to assert that unification is inevitable, signaling his determination to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control sooner rather than later.

Later articles in this series discuss warning signs of a crisis, the initial events and later consequences. In this article we begin with outlines of the four scenarios we wargamed:

Subversion—The shadow war

During the Spanish Civil War, Nationalist forces advancing on cities such as Madrid relied on what was called a fifth column, a covert network of sympathisers within Republican-held territory who worked to undermine the government from within. Could a similar scenario unfold in Taiwan? According to a former Taiwanese military intelligence director, more than 5,000 people are operating in Taiwan on behalf of the Chinese government.

The activation of a fifth column to incite civil unrest across Taiwan could be highly effective. It could debilitate Taipei’s ability to govern and maintain stability, potentially by exploiting existing fault lines in Taiwanese politics. This could provide Beijing with a pretext to deploy what it might call stabilisation forces. A fifth column could plausibly target critical infrastructure, disrupting power grids, railways, air traffic control and water treatment facilities. Bomb threats, arson attacks and incitement of riots would further destabilise society. Combined with Beijing’s formidable cyber capabilities, China could sow chaos and division while publicly denying any involvement. This would give Beijing the opportunity to shape the narrative, spread propaganda and justify intervention as a response to what it could claim is an internal matter.

Quarantine—The lawfare veil

As China increasingly integrates its coast guard into military exercises around Taiwan, the prospect of a quarantine scenario has gained growing attention. In such a scenario, Beijing could manufacture a crisis to justify the imposition of a quarantine around the island. For example, it might claim that all inbound and outbound shipments require inspection due to national security concerns, such as alleged arms transfers or biological threats.

With more than 150 large ocean-going vessels, the China Coast Guard is well-equipped to enforce such a quarantine. Likely operating in coordination with the navy, which would stand off at a distance, the coast guard could try to divert commercial shipping and apply great pressure on Taiwan’s government. This would likely be accompanied by cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns designed to sow confusion, disrupt governance and further isolate Taiwan. If external support were insufficient or slow to materialise, the cumulative pressure could force Taipei to the negotiating table on Beijing’s terms.

Blockade—The siege

Since 2022, China’s military has frequently conducted large exercises around Taiwan. In the 2022 drills, it took four days for the armed forces to encircle the island in one such exercise. By 2023, they achieved this in just two days. In 2024, Chinese warships could complete a full maritime encirclement of Taiwan within 24 hours.

A blockade would differ from a quarantine by being absolute, forbidding movement of all ships to and from Taiwan, not just those carrying supposed contraband, and air movements, too.

China would likely aim to isolate Taiwan by deploying its navy to close off key ports, using its air force to disrupt air traffic, and positioning aircraft carriers, submarines and missile systems to deter foreign intervention. Undersea internet cables could be cut, cyberattacks launched to cripple communications and critical infrastructure, and on-island operatives, such as special forces or fifth-column actors, could carry out acts of sabotage to intensify pressure on Taipei. Beijing might manufacture a pretext to justify such actions.

But regardless of the reasoning, a blockade is generally regarded as an act of war and carries real risk of military intervention from the United States and others.

Invasion—A war of no winners

Xi has directed his armed forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency. This does not necessarily mean China will launch an invasion that year but, rather, that the military should be capable of performing one then if ordered. Unlike Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, China cannot simply roll over a land border. Taiwan is separated from the mainland by the Taiwan Strait, which is 130 kilometres wide at its narrowest point.

China could conceal preparations for an invasion by framing it as a large-scale joint exercise. To date, these drills have involved missile units, marines and naval forces, strategic bombers and fighter jets, as well as cyber and logistic units. Should Xi give the order, the opening phase would be a massive missile barrage targeting Taiwan’s airbases, radar stations, naval ports and command centres. Simultaneously, China’s air force would launch waves of fighters, drones and bombers to suppress Taiwan’s air defences, while amphibious and airborne assault forces began their push from China’s eastern seaboard.

The early days of such a conflict would likely see intense, brutal combat as Taiwan’s military fights to repel the assault. The human and strategic costs would be enormous for both sides. If the US decided to intervene, the world could quickly find itself on the brink of a global conflict.

Beijing’s pros and cons

This article has been updated to add references and links to other articles in the series.