At first, it may not be easy to see what’s afoot. The difference between China’s routine coercion of Taiwan and early signs of serious escalation to take control of the island may not be clear.
That will be the case whether China tried any of the four main choices it has for attempting to subjugate Taiwan—subversion, a quarantine, blockade or full-scale invasion. ASPI wargamed each on 10 June, with the findings outlined in this series of daily articles, including a description of the scenarios in the first. The next two will examine opening events and longer-term results.
Some indicators and warnings would be observable before China fully launched its operation. Subtle shifts in its political messaging, military deployments, cyber activity, disinformation campaigns and overseas influence operations might all signal intent to act.
In all scenarios, the opening signs will likely include new rhetoric, possibly portraying Taiwan as having crossed a red line. A spike in cyberattacks and information operations, including information operations within China, designed to project and amplify those claims, would also be a likely sign common to all scenarios.
Beijing may then stage what appears to be a routine, large-scale exercise around the island, but with forces venturing beyond their usual training zones. Meanwhile, logistics elements, such as transport convoys, field hospitals, fuel depots and ammunition stores, would quietly amass near embarkation points, and reserve units may mobilise under cover of night.
When these indicators appear together, the risk that Beijing is preparing to act against Taiwan increases significantly. Warning signs will then differ depending on what type of action Beijing is planning to take.
Subversion
In a subversion scenario, we may notice a sudden surge in disruptive incidents against Taiwan’s critical infrastructure—such as failures in electricity supply, rail services, water treatment and air traffic control. Behind the scenes, China’s covert operatives would be orchestrating these attacks, while its information campaigns would seek to undermine public confidence in Taipei. Social-media accounts might amplify rumours of governmental collapse or even mass defections among senior leaders. Any visible redeployment of Chinese military assets could be presented as humanitarian readiness, plausible cover for forces positioned to exploit the resulting chaos.
Quarantine
In a quarantine scenario, the first warning would likely come from Beijing’s political rhetoric, with official statements possibly raising alarms about alleged biological threats or arms smuggling originating in Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party’s United Front apparatus would likely amplify these claims across diplomatic channels and sympathetic media, sowing doubt and pre-empting an international response. Meanwhile, a steady stream of China Coast Guard vessels would likely begin to concentrate around Taiwan’s major southern ports under the guise of an exercise. At the same time, Chinese naval would likely position themselves at strategic chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel, north of the Philippines, and Miyako Strait, near Okinawa, quietly establishing the outer perimeter of a de facto quarantine zone. Aircraft would begin patrolling the same places.
Blockade
Unlike a quarantine, which China can present as a limited, legally justified measure, a blockade is generally regarded as an act of war. Beijing would almost certainly adopt more aggressive rhetoric, declaring that Taiwan had crossed a red line to legitimise its actions. The Chinese navy and coast guard would surge into positions east and west of the island, quietly forming the maritime perimeter of a blockade. At the same time, the air force would intensify operations in Taiwan’s airspace, flying repeated incursions to probe defences and confuse early-warning systems with a multiplicity of targets. Behind the scenes, coordinated cyberattacks would target Taiwan’s financial sector, media outlets, military networks and government systems, setting the stage for widespread digital disruption. Other elements of China’s military, including missile units, submarines and aircraft carrier battle groups, would likely move to supporting positions, their presence serving both to deter third-party intervention and to reinforce the blockade’s effect.
Invasion
An invasion would be China’s most decisive form of escalation. Ahead of it, Beijing would likely intensify diplomatic pressure, possibly accusing Taipei of edging toward a unilateral declaration of independence. Yet in the final days before an assault, Chinese leaders might go quiet to preserve surprise. Behind the scenes, coordinated cyberattacks would target Taiwan’s power grids, communications and other critical infrastructure, while disinformation and psychological operations flooded Taiwanese media to sow confusion and fear.
What may initially appear to be a large-scale exercise could quickly evolve into full mobilisation. Amphibious assault ships, transport aircraft and missile units would move into forward positions under the guise of drills, while military flights surged around Taiwan. Carrier strike groups and submarines would deploy east and south of the island, and strategic forces may reposition nuclear-capable assets to deter foreign intervention. Perhaps the clearest sign of an impending invasion would be rapid movement of field hospitals, fuel convoys and engineering units to embarkation points. This would be an unmistakable signal that an assault force is readying for action.
