As tensions grow between China and the West, and Moscow drifts further into Beijing’s orbit, a strategic question is emerging. In 1971, the United States opened to Mao’s China to weaken the Soviet Union. Could a future recalibration—this time toward Russia and by all of the West—help limit China’s regional dominance?

The idea of engaging Russia may be politically unpalatable right now, but long-term strategy demands creative thinking. Perpetual isolation would only accelerate Russia’s dependence on China.

As China and Russia grow closer, their partnership is uneven. Russia leans on China for markets, technology and diplomatic cover. China, meanwhile, gains influence in Central Asia and the Arctic, cheap energy and a possible source of continental supply of resources in case its sea routes are cut in a war.

This isn’t a formal axis—yet. But if left unchecked, we could see deeper alignment.

A permanently isolated Russia could give China even more freedom to push its strategic agenda. It could be even more confident than now of Moscow backing it in international forums and disputes.

But a more autonomous Russia—eventually, after the war, under new leadership—might not be so eager to toe China’s line. Historically, Russian and Chinese interests have clashed more often than they have aligned. In Central Asia, in the Arctic, even in northeast Asia, these two powers have competing ambitions. We should be thinking now about how to use that.

It’s not something that can be put into action until, someday, Vladmir Putin leaves the stage.

In discussions with other Western countries, Australia should promote the idea of eventual re-engagement with Russia. It should do so quietly, making clear that this does not imply any easing of the consequences imposed on Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine.

Sanctions have weakened Russia but also pushed it deeper into Beijing’s orbit. We should not reward aggression, but diplomacy is rarely about moral purity. If we don’t think ahead, China will—it already is, locking in long-term energy deals, expanding its economic leverage, and aligning with Moscow in multilateral forums that challenge Western influence.

Before Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, took the initiative in 1971, no one imagined the president sitting with Mao. But it worked. The move helped ensure that the 1960s break between Moscow and Beijing would continue, and gave the US leverage for decades. We’re not in the same situation, but the lesson still applies: uncomfortable diplomacy can create strategic space.

Australia has limited leverage alone. But as a regional actor with global ties, we have a voice. Quietly encouraging our partners to consider a long-term plan for re-engaging Russia—under the right conditions—could prove valuable. At the very least, it gives us options.