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Under Prabowo, military-security apparatus will have more say in foreign policy

Posted By on October 31, 2024 @ 06:00

As Jakarta geared up for the Indonesian armed forces’ 79th anniversary on 5 October, there seemed to be an added frisson in the air. Amid the martial scene of massed military equipment in central Jakarta and with the 20 October inauguration of Prabowo Subianto approaching, it felt like Indonesia was on the cusp of something new—yet also familiar.

Key ministerial appointments and machinery of government changes to date suggest Prabowo’s approach to governance is reminiscent of the Suharto era, characterised by greater political centrality and policy influence for the military-security apparatus. That includes foreign policy.

Prabowo served in the armed forces from 1970 to 1998, when the power of Indonesia’s military-security apparatus was at its apex. This system, known as hankam, embodied a range of defence, intelligence and security functions focused chiefly on suppression of internal dissent and separatist insurgencies.

The former power of the hankam apparatus was anchored in the military’s dual socio-political role, dwifungsi. This doctrine legitimated a sweeping role for the armed forces across Indonesian society and all levels of government.

Concerningly, a drift back towards a dwifungsi-type paradigm has been seen in the development of Indonesia’s civil-military relations, especially over the last five years of Joko Widodo’s presidency. It showed up in proposed revisions [1] to a law governing the armed forces, for example. Scholars have noted a pattern of democratic regression in Widodo’s second term.

The exact link between policy, the military’s rising political influence and the loyalties and motivations of military officers may not be immediately clear. However, shifts in the balance of Indonesia’s civil-military relations have historically had broader implications for good governance and policy implementation.

Prabowo has appointed Sugiono—a legislator, Kopassus first lieutenant and former official of the new president’s Gerindra Party—as foreign minister, replacing well-regarded career diplomat Retno Marsudi. This may bookend a 26-year reform journey for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This journey [2] began with Indonesia’s democratic political transition in 1998. Sweeping legislative and policy reforms ended the Suharto-era practice of reserving foreign affairs leadership positions and priority ambassadorial posts for military officers. Democratic consolidation in the early 2000s further empowered civilian foreign-policy actors and democratic norms were internalised within Indonesia’s foreign policy.

To be fair, Sugiono is no longer an active military officer, but he has clearly remained a loyal adjutant to Prabowo through his previous Kopassus military service and Prabowo’s patronage [3] of him in the Gerindra Party. In fact, Sugiono’s appointment is a departure from even Suharto-era diplomatic traditions. Suharto, himself a former general and one of Asia’s wiliest and most enduring political leaders, preferred career diplomats over military men as foreign ministers.

Prabowo’s ministerial appointments [4] are clearly driven by a need to dispense political rewards. But his foreign affairs, defence and political-security portfolio picks—Sugiono, former Kopassus officer Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Budi Gunawan, respectively—reflect the importance of loyalty and personalised chains of command.

While the Prabowo-Sugiono team is unlikely to make wholesale changes to Indonesia’s foreign-policy principle of non-alignment, expect some more creative reinterpretations of it. In Prabowo’s Indonesia, non-alignment now includes biennial exercises [5] with the Russian navy in Indonesian waters and resumption [6] of military exercises with the People’s Liberation Army.

Sugiono’s first days as foreign minister already signal a departure from the foreign ministry’s cautious instincts. His announcement [7] that Indonesia would seek full BRICs membership, despite the ministry’s earlier reticence, reveals he has been tasked with implementing Prabowo’s bolder foreign policy agenda, probably without question.

This policy agenda aims to expand Indonesia’s diplomatic influence on the global stage while boosting the country’s hard power. Defence spending is to increase from 0.7 to 1.5 percent of GDP.

The political changes currently taking place in Indonesia are strongly reminiscent of the Suharto era. Prabowo’s election victory and major ministerial picks prolong a trajectory in civil-military relations that was strengthened during Widodo’s second term. Although much remains uncertain about the balance of Indonesia’s foreign policy interests, the resurgence of the hankam apparatus suggests the locus of foreign policy influence in Indonesia has now shifted.



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URLs in this post:

[1] revisions: https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2024/07/22/not-the-militarys-business.html

[2] journey: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/508353

[3] patronage: https://jakartaglobe.id/news/prabowo-picks-gerindras-jedi-knight-sugiono-as-his-foreign-minister

[4] ministerial appointments: https://www.voanews.com/a/former-special-forces-commander-prabowo-to-take-up-indonesian-presidency/7829066.html

[5] biennial exercises: https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2024/10/20/russia-indonesia-to-hold-joint-navy-drills-in-november-tass-says.html

[6] resumption: https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/whats-behind-the-resumption-of-china-indonesia-military-exercises/

[7] announcement: https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/indonesia-to-push-for-full-brics-membership-new-foreign-minister-says/

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