Australia must develop a national logistics plan to support combat operations in its primary theatre.

Defence’s primary strategic guidance, the National Defence Strategy, has chapters on people, innovation, acquisition and partnerships. It does not talk about logistics, assuming perhaps that this will just happen. Defence appears to simply take for granted the availability and adequacy of existing civilian infrastructure, with no strategic planning to ensure it actually has satisfactory and reliable access to roads, rail and ports. This is a logistical vulnerability that must be addressed.

Australia has underinvested in logistical infrastructure for decades. This will be a liability in the event of a conflict, especially one where Australia acts as both a participant and as a host for allied and partner nations. The poor state of transport infrastructure in Australia already costs the nation through delays to freight or long diversions. In the worst-case scenario, this lack of investment may disrupt force generation and risk the sustainment of deployed formations.

This underinvestment is best exemplified in northern Australia, and perhaps most obviously in Townsville. This city is home to the 3rd Brigade, a formation designated as an armoured amphibious brigade. Armoured formations impose a particularly heavy logistical burden. Armoured formations deployed via amphibious vessels create further logistical complexity. Defence’s direction to establish this capability in Townsville was unaccompanied by any supporting logistic plan. It appears that, again, the assumption is that logistics will just happen.

The Australian Defence Force must consider both sustainment and force projection for its logistic needs. Sustainment for the armoured units of the 3rd Brigade means having the necessary classes of supply and resources to maximise availability of serviceable platforms. With a large fleet of complex vehicles that are regularly pushed to their limits, a local sustainment hub is the only logical way to ensure that.

Any support contract for the army’s armoured fighting vehicles must include a local sustainment plan that ensures repairs and maintenance are done near to operating units. While it may be expensive in the short term, failure to adhere to this logistical necessity will impose a far greater long-term financial burden and, worse, reduce the availability of vehicles and readiness of operators.

Townsville’s location is highly advantageous for the 3rd Brigade, but without the coherence of a national strategy, it remains vulnerable to unnecessary risks. For example, consider the interior lines of communication that would support logistics in a crisis. Movement of 3rd Brigade personnel and equipment from Townsville would rely on the roads and rail systems that carry freight from the industrial precincts in the south.

Ironically, the amphibious brigade’s supply chain is regularly interrupted by excess water: wet-season floods disrupt the highways and rail lines that carry goods to Townsville. This isolates the brigade and prevents logistical resupply. Upgrading the Bruce Highway, or building an alternative route, is a matter of national security. Such initiatives would also improve civil productivity and safety.

Yet, even when roads are open, the brigade is somewhat isolated. The other combat formation in Australia’s north, the 1st Brigade in Darwin, occupies what is arguably the other national mounting point for land force projection. It would make sense to have a line of communication that safely and securely allows force movements between these two points without exposure to air and maritime threats.

Australia’s lack of a coherent national strategy, however, means that this internal line is inherently fragile. The Flinders Highway, which connects Mount Isa to Townsville, cannot be reliably used to transport armoured vehicles between our two force projection hubs. This road is also cut by flooding during the wet season and is subject to oversize and overmass restrictions on key bridges.

It is uncertain if the 3rd Brigade could guarantee local berth access to embark when ordered to deploy. Again, the lack of a national strategy that integrates logistics with Defence’s needs has led to a situation where the Port of Townsville, only kilometres from the 3rd Brigade’s base, does not have purpose-built facilities to support embarkation or disembarkation of the brigade’s armoured fighting vehicles.

Army’s new watercraft cannot use Ross Island Barracks and Defence have not committed to the planned expansion at the Port of Townsville, an expansion that would include facilities for landing craft to berth and embark or disembark tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles. Without this facility, and with access to commercial berths not assured, the army may be forced to transport vehicles via road to another suitable port—at huge cost.

Australia must integrate transport infrastructure with defence strategy. It is difficult to fathom the army’s acceptance of risk to the movement of heavy combat vehicles via the most direct route, constant disruption to supply lines via flood-prone roads, and inability to guarantee access and use of fit-for-purpose berths in the closest port.