Australia’s next National Defence Strategy (NDS) risks overlooking a crucial vulnerability that’s hiding in plain sight: our people, and particularly women. The 2024 strategy identified improving workforce growth and retention as one of six immediate priorities, yet as policymakers draft the 2026 NDS, we’re still missing an obvious solution.
Women comprise just 19.2 percent of the Australian Defence Force. Facing a workforce crisis that requires recruiting, retaining and growing an increasingly specialised workforce, we have underutilised a strategic asset that could address our capability gaps.
This isn’t about diversity quotas. This is about operational readiness.
The numbers tell a stark story. Despite receiving 75,000 applications and having ambitious targets to reach 69,000 ADF personnel by the early 2030s, Defence struggles with declining recruitment and retention rates. Concurrently, the ADF is falling around 4,500 personnel short of its recruitment targets, with technical roles under particular strain.
The 2024 NDS emphasised cyber as a critical domain within its integrated force structure. It explicitly commits to a whole-of-nation approach, rendering all aspects of national power. Yet systematically underutilising women contradicts this whole-of-nation imperative. The government prioritises recruitment of personnel with science and technology skills to support the NDS but still faces chronic shortages. Women comprise 16 percent of Australia’s cyber workforce, but leave after an average of four years, primarily due to workplace culture. We can’t afford to keep haemorrhaging talent from half the population.
NATO allies recognised this strategic imperative years ago. Between 2020 and 2021, NATO countries saw an 11.2 percent increase in the number of women successfully completing military recruitment processes, from 67.8 percent to 79 percent. As of the 2018 NATO Summary of the National Reports, which collected data from 22 of 28 member states, 18 of member states had active duty positions open to women. NATO members have also implemented retention policies, including parental rights and support for pregnant women and, which have significantly improved recruitment outcomes. These countries didn’t do this out of charity, but because operational effectiveness demanded it.
Norway introduced compulsory national service (initial recruitment draft selection) for both men and women in 2015. By 2020, 33 percent of people completing initial service were women. The Norwegian model offers particularly relevant lessons. Its selective military service has an acceptance rate of 17 percent, making it more competitive than most universities, and 36 percent of accepted conscripts in 2023 were women. Through selectivity and support structures, Norway has transformed service from a dreary obligation into a prestigious opportunity.
Australia’s 2026 NDS should embed a workforce initiative for women in security, with three pragmatic, cost-effective pillars that align with existing Defence priorities.
The first pillar should be the introduction of fast-tracked technical pathways. In 2024, Defence’s recruitment process was 300 days—long enough to lose excellent candidates to private sector offers. We should create 90-day accelerated streams specifically for women transitioning from cyber, engineering, or science and technology roles. These aren’t people who need training from scratch; they already have transferable technical skills. Rapid assessment and onboarding would get them to an operational standard quickly, which is exactly what an integrated, ready force needs.
The second pillar should be the improvement of flexible service models. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Australia introduced flexible working arrangements, adjusted start times, and protections for parents facing deployment. Retention improved among women as a result. Canberra should build on these policies by piloting part-time service options for technical specialists in non-deployable roles. These could include cyber analysts, intelligence officers and logistics planners; roles where physical deployment isn’t constant, but expertise is critical. This approach costs far less than the endless cycle of recruiting and retraining replacements, and it keeps institutional knowledge intact.
The third pillar should be industry–defence rotations: two-year exchange programs between Defence and industry for technical specialists, with a focus on recruiting women. Defence would get access to cutting-edge private sector expertise, industry would get security-cleared professionals who understand operational requirements, and individuals would get career diversity without derailing their progression. Singapore does this successfully through its defence science and technology sector, building knowledge-sharing pipelines across government and industry.
The 2024 NDS highlights that people are Defence’s most important asset and acknowledges the need to evolve Defence culture to underpin significant reform. The 2026 iteration must go further, explicitly recognising gender inclusion as strategic capability building, not supplemental workforce policy.
Australia’s strategic challenges; workforce shortfalls, technological competition, regional instability—demand all-hands-on-deck solutions. The 2026 NDS will commit to bold capability targets and integrated deterrence, but capability targets mean nothing if we can’t staff them. Deterrence fails if we can’t sustain it, and integration rings hollow when we’re only integrating half our population.
Defence has already introduced initiatives, including widening eligibility criteria and streamlining recruitment, demonstrating it can adapt quickly when necessary. Our NATO allies have adapted. Our competitors are mobilising comprehensively. The 2026 NDS must apply that same urgency to gender inclusion—not as social policy, but as the strategic workforce imperative it is.
Women aren’t a workforce supplement for Defence; we’re an untapped strategic asset. The 2026 strategy needs to recognise that, because in strategic competition, self-imposed limitations are among most dangerous.