Has India blinked?
Posted By
Aakriti Bachhawat
on April 26, 2018 @ 16:00
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s announcement that he plans to visit China for an
‘informal summit’ with President Xi Jinping is part of a
‘reset’ strategy vis-à-vis Beijing that New Delhi has embarked upon in the last few months.
It’s the culmination of a series of outreach measures and comes on the heels of Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s
attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) defence ministers’ meeting and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s
presence at the corresponding foreign ministers’ event in China this week. Modi’s visit will put the official stamp on the ‘reset’ and is likely to have
significant implications for the region.
Notably, its speculated that Modi’s upcoming visit is the result of an
invitation from Beijing and is even more interesting because he is
already scheduled to attend the SCO summit in China in June this year. It appears that the Indian government’s overtures to China in recent months, including visits by the Indian
foreign secretary and
national security advisor, and the
withdrawal of its support to a Tibetan event held in New Delhi, have borne fruit and are being reciprocated by the PRC.
More importantly, in what has been interpreted as shameful kowtowing to Beijing, India
refrained from intervening to resolve the political crisis in the Maldives in February, ignoring
calls from several Indian defence analysts to take definitive action. Furthermore, there are already
rumours that India will remove its ‘blanket opposition’ to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), even though it would
continue to oppose the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Remarkably, this apparent ‘thaw’ in relations comes months after the
face-off between the two Asian giants in Doklam near the
triboundary junction of China, India and Bhutan, a crisis in which India had maintained a
steadfast resolve and appeared to have
won diplomatic leverage. Moreover, persistent Chinese opposition to India’s aspirations to join the
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and become a permanent member on the
United Nations Security Council are long-standing thorns in the relationship.
As well, China’s move at the UN to
block the listing of Jaish-e-Mohammad group leader and mastermind of attacks on India, Masood Azhar, as a terrorist served as another major irritant. At a time when Chinese assertiveness and adventurism is growing rapidly, and Beijing is increasingly encroaching upon India’s strategic space—especially in the Indian Ocean Region—India seems to be dialling back from the position of strength it accrued post-Doklam last year.
So, what accounts for this dramatic turnaround in Indian policy within a matter of months?
The simplest explanation is that this is India’s default strategic position and is symbolic of a
pattern of docility that has characterised several Indian governments vis-à-vis China in the past, often with
disastrous results. Moreover, there are
reports that China is preparing for another round of provocations in Doklam now that the winter is over and
road building can begin again. The Modi government doesn’t have the appetite for another clash along the border at a time when it’s preoccupied with
domestic issues, struggling with the
cost of economic reforms and preparing for the 2019
general elections. New Delhi also finds itself unable to
reduce the trade deficit with Beijing, now running at
US$52 billion.
Also, India realises that its
relations with Pakistan aren’t going to improve, and prudence demands that it limit the number of adversaries it has, especially where both in this case have nuclear teeth.
More significantly, this policy shift could in part be attributed to the uncertainty hanging over geopolitical dynamics in the region. Donald Trump’s
transactional attitude to foreign policy and
vacillating stance on US commitment to its allies and friends leave little room for strategic manoeuvring for middle and rising powers. The Modi government’s strategy may also recognise Beijing’s growing clout in the region and especially in India’s neighbourhood. Engagement rather than confrontation seems to be more palatable to New Delhi.
However, it’s worth considering the damage this shift is likely to do to India’s own regional standing and reputation as the
net security provider to the small countries in South Asia. It’s important to remember that India emerged from the Doklam episode looking much better than China—the incident was
recognised as a case study in how to deal with Chinese assertiveness. By turning a blind eye to blatant Chinese power wielding in the Maldives, all in an effort to avoid antagonising Beijing, India is
setting an example to its smaller neighbours like Sri Lanka and Nepal of what they can expect if they have a run-in with the dragon. Although the boundary dispute is said to be on the diplomatic table, it’s unlikely that it’ll ever be resolved without substantial concessions from India.
Furthermore, if this pattern of strategic kowtowing continues, it could spell the end to any chance of the
rebirth of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as India is unlikely to participate in any grouping with even remotely anti-China connotations. Already,
Japan and
Australia seem to be in need of
strategic reassurance in the face of an unpredictable US and a revisionist China. India’s strategic reorientation could mean that the grouping will either never materialise or will quickly become redundant. India’s
refusal to allow Australia to participate in the annual Japan–US–India Malabar naval exercises this year—despite repeated requests from Australia—is a case in point and goes to show that the Quad will likely die a premature death.
Finally, being the
only major country to formally oppose the BRI last year—
leading other countries, including
Australia and the
US, to reassess their own views of it, any indication that India is
softening its position on China’s mega-infrastructure project could open the door for further bargaining with Beijing.
Modi’s visit to China for an ‘informal summit’ is thus significant for what it symbolises. It’s clear that
neither side is expecting any breakthroughs but the optics indicate that India blinked first.
Aakriti Bachhawat is a Research Assistant at the Griffith Asia Institute. Image courtesy the Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons.
Article printed from The Strategist: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au
URL to article: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-blinked-first/
[1] ‘informal summit’: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-modi-to-visit-china-for-talks-with-president-xi/articleshow/63868626.cms
[2] ‘reset’: https://www.firstpost.com/india/outreach-by-swaraj-and-sitharaman-signals-india-seeks-soft-reset-of-ties-with-china-not-a-factory-reset-4444961.html
[3] attendance: https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/opinion-india-china-ties-to-get-boost-nirmala-sitharaman-visit-to-beijing
[4] presence: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/sushma-swaraj-arrives-in-china-for-bilateral-talks-sco-meeting-1840904
[5] invitation: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/all-set-for-reset-pm-modi-and-chinas-xi-jinping-to-hold-informal-meet-this-week-5147817/
[6] foreign secretary: http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-china-hold-across-the-board-talks-during-foreign-secretarys-visit/article22845555.ece
[7] national security advisor: http://annx.asianews.network/content/india-nsa-visits-china-meets-key-chinese-official-70880
[8] withdrawal of its support: https://sputniknews.com/asia/201803231062830276-india-calls-off-tibet-convention/
[9] refrained from intervening: https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/china-factor-deters-india-from-maldives-intervention-1.705660
[10] calls from several Indian defence analysts: https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/R6dapbeubmuZUY4zYjLr4H/Why-India-should-intervene-in-Maldives.html
[11] rumours : https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ahead-of-sco-meet-delhi-may-refrain-from-a-blanket-opposition-to-chinas-obor/articleshow/63589537.cms
[12] continue to oppose: https://www.deccanherald.com/content/666720/india-may-tone-down-its.html
[13] face-off: https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/whats-driving-the-india-china-standoff-at-doklam/
[14] triboundary junction: https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-political-geography-of-the-india-china-crisis-at-doklam/
[15] steadfast resolve: https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/E1E1CraMyFLK2ZCZuW1zIN/Doklam-standoff-The-takeaways-for-India.html
[16] won diplomatic leverage: https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/diplomacy-in-doklam-new-strategic-ground-for-india-in-south-asia/
[17] Nuclear Suppliers’ Group: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-says-no-change-in-its-stand-on-indias-membership-to-nsg/articleshow/61966031.cms
[18] United Nations Security Council: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-power-temporarily-at-un-security-council-1667565
[19] block: https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ABEmOW05luaAgJjaVcrfqI/China-says-no-consensus-over-listing-Masood-Azhar-as-global.html
[20] pattern of docility: https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/8mRtIIZMAEQiaanZTCx0jM/Indias-China-appeasement-itch.html
[21] disastrous results: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/02/how-long-can-china-and-india-avoid-war-in-the-himalayas/
[22] reports: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2124375/china-building-troop-numbers-near-doklam-after-summer
[23] road building: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-trying-to-outflank-indias-positions-with-road-in-doklam/articleshow/63372874.cms
[24] domestic issues: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/can-the-modi-government-halt-indias-economic-tailspin/
[25] cost of economic reforms: http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/india-modi-government-reforms-put-nation-on-rocky-road-to-capitalism-20180322-h0xtpa
[26] general elections: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/amit-shah-says-bjp-started-preparations-for-2019-the-day-after-modi-govt-took-oath-1197803-2018-03-25
[27] reduce the trade deficit: https://carnegieindia.org/2018/04/10/raja-mandala-india-s-china-reset-and-bri-pub-76028
[28] relations with Pakistan: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/citing-terrorism-india-says-time-not-ripe-for-saarc-summit-in-pakistan/story-qKyRiUx3xwcHx2QXwmH6KO.html
[29] transactional attitude: http://www.wsj.com/podcasts/trump-transactional-foreign-policy/ED73B008-6D26-40E0-807C-1326D42F4EF1.html
[30] vacillating stance: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-08/donald-trump-mission-in-asia-not-what-allies-want/9123782
[31] net security provider: http://www.prepze.com/net-security-provider-concept-indias-potential-indian-ocean-region/
[32] recognised: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/doklam-who-won
[33] setting an example: https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-maldives-headache/
[34] rebirth of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-redux-new-agenda-asia-maritime-democracies
[35] Japan: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/world/asia/japan-abe-trump.html
[36] Australia: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/almost-half-of-us-fear-china-could-become-a-threat/news-story/01ae3b547985a0a26a798b77cc4fcd10
[37] strategic reassurance: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-australia-and-japan-need-plan-b
[38] refusal: https://www.deccanherald.com/national/india-us-japan-malabar-exercise-guam-june-666625.html
[39] only major country: http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/only-country-to-oppose-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-is-india-us-expert-118013000710_1.html
[40] leading other countries: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-feeling-heat-belt-road
[41] Australia: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/one-in-three-lined-up-for-chinas-bri-loans-face-debt-distress/news-story/b26c2ce383eac0198b1948625f7a2aee
[42] US: https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/india-united-states-need-rethink-opposition-china-led-connectivity/
[43] neither side is expecting any breakthroughs: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/modi-xi-informal-summit-hopes-of-a-big-breakthrough-are-misplaced-118042500155_1.html