To signal resolve to China, Australia must develop and clearly communicate a broadened strategic reliance on Indo-Pacific partners.

One of the most challenging aspects of Australia’s relationship with China is finding new ways to signal our interest in keeping the region open and free. Central to that is our willingness to develop meaningful strategic partnerships with other regional countries.

This task is complicated by Beijing’s habit of seeing Australian interests as aspects of alliance relationships, particularly the Australia-US alliance.

While automatic alignment of Australian and US interests in China’s strategic thinking has long been annoying, it has not until recently become something we need to actively change.

Through words and actions, Canberra needs to more clearly show China that Australia is willing to strengthen our alliances and forge new strategic partnerships outside of them, and that must include open acknowledgement that few of the problems China poses can be solved without a broader collective.

Our ability to deal with Beijing’s bilateral pressure-and-release tactics is not in question. Australia has withstood long-term economic coercion from China. At the same time, it has strengthened defence and security cooperation with the US through agreements such as the United States Force Posture Initiatives. This, alongside the advent of AUKUS and its promise of a more impactful regional security role, speaks volumes about the resilience of Australia and its alliances.

This does not mean, however, that China’s leaders understand the resolve and longevity of Australia’s regional partnerships.

At the 2024 Pacific Island Forum meeting, leaders agreed to remove an accurate reference to Taiwan as a ‘development partner’ from its communique. This followed coercive and intimidatory behaviour from China’s ambassador to the Pacific, despite China being only a dialogue partner rather than a forum member.

While countries such as Australia likely viewed fighting the concession as not being worth the battle, Beijing will now see it as a precedent for all minilateral and multilateral groupings; the collective backdown will reinforce China’s belief in its ability to dictate who cares about what and with what degree of commitment.

Once such a view is formed institutionally in Beijing, it is very difficult to change.

Another such view is China’s characterisation of Australia as a subordinate partner within the Australia-US alliance. Premier Li Qiang’s June meeting with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese showed that China’s leaders believe that Australia’s blind allegiance to the alliance is leading us to do things we don’t really want to do. If only we were savvy enough to think this through for ourselves and brave enough to say ‘no’ to Washington more often, our future would be much brighter—so their assumption goes.

Even if China’s leaders don’t genuinely believe this to be the case, it is problematic, if only because it feeds the deputy sheriff characterisation that we need to move past.

Canberra’s public framing of its regional security cooperation strategy matters. Considered communication around our broader strategic reliance will not only help to shift domestic narratives; it will also signal our resolve to China and reaffirm our regional presence.

Take Australia’s enhanced defence and security cooperation with Tokyo. It is and should be framed as the product of a trusted partnership—one that is evolving in response to China’s destabilising behaviour and the associated risks to our shared values and mutual strategic interests.

Australia doesn’t need a formal alliance with Japan to have shared interests and values, or to develop critical capabilities and maintain a strong desire to keep the region from being dominated by a single actor. Similarly, Indonesia’s non-aligned status does not (and should not) stop us from wanting to strengthen defence and security ties, as the recent signing of a new bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement shows.

It is telling that such a significant step could be taken against the backdrop of Jakarta’s initial reservations about AUKUS and Canberra’s uneasiness with president-elect Probowo’s stated intention to work with Russia on civil nuclear energy and conduct bilateral military exercises with China.

But this is a sign of the times. Unlike the old days where a single irritant—such as whaling in the Japanese case—would colour the entire relationship and set back defence and security cooperation for years, all countries in the region are looking at what is happening around them and see a need to work together in ways that serve larger interests. There is a kind of strategic lightness of touch in the way that most regional actors are now thinking that is allowing cross-cutting and unlikely partnerships to form quickly.

Consistently expressed comfort with the concept of broader strategic reliance will position Canberra to make the most of these opportunities while subverting China’s firmly held expectations.  That works for Australia.