Stepping up military support to humanitarian assistance in the Pacific—recommendations for the Pacific Response Group
The newly agreed Pacific defence response group to help with disaster relief will help to solidify Australia’s role as a primary provider of security assistance. It also gives the region a vital tool to promote narratives of Pacific-led security, reducing the need for military assistance from outside countries such as China.
But the Pacific Response Group, from a modest start, will need to be ready to expand in its size, role and membership. Australia needs to be prepared to dedicate a larger component of its own military forces to a future PRG expansion, or to training and funding of additional components from Pacific island countries. These are among the contentions we put forward in our
ASPI report released today,
Stepping up military support to humanitarian assistance in the Pacific: Recommendations for the Pacific Response Group.
The ninth South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) formally endorsed the establishment of the PRG last week in Auckland. It is a novel multinational military initiative aimed at deepening cooperation between Pacific militaries to deliver military support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).
Pacific leaders have declared that climate change is their most pressing security concern—and the region remains highly susceptible to natural disasters and severe weather events. Pacific island nations are also experiencing an unprecedented level of competition for influence that is reshaping the security environment of the region. Since 2018, many partnering countries have sought to step up their engagement and presence in the region, leading to a contest of narratives and values across diplomatic, economic, strategic and military domains.
Australia is looking to provide genuine support and capability to the region, as it has done for decades. Equally, it can’t shy away from the strategic contest. The Australian government would be well aware that by supporting regional military cooperation on this level, it will be better positioned to prevent China from achieving a greater foothold with Pacific island militaries. Even if blocking out China is not the primary intent of the PRG, it is likely to be portrayed as such by China in its digital diplomacy and state media communications in the same way as the recently endorsed Pacific Policing Initiative.
In fact, the PRG provides a welcome chance to build regional resilience, capability and interoperability in responding to natural disasters and addressing environmental security. By pooling Pacific military resources and personnel in a more coordinated fashion, the member countries will be able to respond to disasters in the region with greater effectiveness and efficiency.
Australia wants to minimise the Chinese security presence in the Pacific without impinging on Pacific sovereignty. Done right, a regional security initiative like the PRG should mean less need for external support from outside the region, including China. Being Pacific-owned and led, the PRG won’t intrude on the sovereignty of its members.
PRG members should publicly push back against any narratives that suggest this initiative is competition-driven and remind other states that successful security initiatives inevitably lead to a reduced need for outside support. At the same time, Australia should be more transparent about its concerns with a greater Chinese security presence in the region. This would ideally lead to understood and agreed ground rules about members states’ security engagement with China.
Despite the promise this initiative offers, questions still loom over how much it will improve the region’s capacity to respond to disasters as environmental and climate threats intensify, requiring more resources to be spent more often on humanitarian disasters. This will come at the expense of training and preparing for, and responding to, other defence and security incidents that need military attention. As a co-ordination mechanism, the PRG won’t yet meet many of the Pacific’s larger security needs in this space, including more capabilities and greater integration across whole-of-government support in a crisis.
Given the scale of the climate threat, member states will need to consider an expansion as soon as the 2025-26 high-risk weather season. In the coming years, the PRG will have to look at potential expansions of its mission into areas such as stability operations. Australia will need to commit greater resources to ensuring that it successfully adapts to the region's needs. The thinking, consultation and some planning for such expansions should start now.
There might also be a role for SPDMM observers such as Japan, the United Kingdom and United States, which could provide financing and support transport and the maintenance of warehouses, stockpiles and security infrastructure.