To solve the ongoing difficulties in framing new rules for space governance, states must revitalise existing measures and consider them in international space policy debates.

In particular, they should look at The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). The HCoC commits states to openness and transparency in space activities, helps codify responsible behaviours and, in doing so, constrains irresponsible ones.

Space governance has been under considerable stress for a while now. Growing space security threats in the form of anti-satellite weapons, cyber and electronic warfare in space have demonstrated the weaknesses of the existing outer space regime. These contemporary challenges are not effectively addressed by existing measures, which points to the urgent need for new regulations. Major powers have struggled to agree on regulation, and the war in Ukraine has made it worse.

Established in 2002, the HCoC is primarily designed to limit ballistic missile proliferation and includes only good-faith commitments to specific types of responsible behaviour. But it does contain commitments related to civil space activities, which are useful in bolstering international space governance.

For example, the 145 subscribing states agree that they will not divert space launch vehicles to the development of ballistic missiles and that they will adhere to transparency measures for space programmes, particularly in relation to space launch vehicles. States also agree to comply with international space laws such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1972 Liability Convention and the 1976 Registration Convention. Additionally, states submit an annual declaration of policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.

These measures have remained critical in maintaining the sanctity of outer space but they are proving to be inadequate in dealing with more contemporary challenges. Efforts in measured openness and limited transparency of this nature can help build confidence in the international space sector, assuming that states honour the voluntary commitments. The HCoC encourages subscribing states to become accustomed to collaboration and openness on outer space issues, which can then facilitate further dialogue and transparency.

In order to build on existing measures, states must consider the HCoC in international space policy debates and highlight its potential for advancing space governance. Given the ongoing deadlock in negotiating new mechanisms, they must focus on strengthening existing ones and encourage other countries to sign up to the HCoC, particularly China, North Korea, Pakistan, Israel and Iran.

There must also be more focus on compliance. This can be achieved through revitalising the Registration Convention and encouraging states to comply with their commitment to provide full information on their launches. This has the potential to be a huge transparency measure that helps lessen mutual suspicions and ease the security dilemma that states face when they consider each other’s actions.

The HCoC is also important as a viable transparency and confidence building measure (TCBM). TCBMs are not given much importance in international security discussions, because they are seen as weak efforts, lacking any enforcement mechanisms. While many criticisms of TCBMs are valid, they have remained an integral part of space policy conversations and should be recognised for their key strengths.

Although some states are sceptical of TCBMs because they cannot replace legal measures, pragmatism is needed in the current global landscape. Sceptical states must recognise what is feasible in the near term to address the growing threats in space, and they must pursue existing tools, such as the HCoC. States should appreciate the benefits of TCBMs, with their broad goal of improving transparency and openness and their role in reducing anxieties and concerns that states have about each other’s space agenda.

There is another advantage of TCBMs such as the HCoC. Legally binding measures such as international treaties with verification measures may be ideal, but they are not viable options within the domestic political context of many states in the Global South.

Such states view legally binding international treaties, especially those with verification protocols, as intrusive. Most have a long history of colonialism and are extremely suspicious of measures seen as threats their sovereignty, such as the Responsibility to Protect. These countries have accepted some treaties that include verification measures such as the Chemical Weapon Convention, but that was at a time when the US could persuade these countries to do so. This is no longer the case.

Cold War history also provides examples of how TCBMs can be useful when other measures are not available. During those years, there was international cooperation between adversaries on voluntary measures, particularly in the nuclear domain. At the peak of the Cold War, the US and the USSR agreed to a hot line for exchange of information in an emergency, which helped increase confidence between the two sides.

Fast forward to the present, TCBMs and other similar measures can now play a significant role in increasing confidence among global powers on issues of space management. Given the high levels of distrust, it is unlikely that they would sign on to legally binding mechanisms. Bolstering existing TCBMs such as the HCoC will provide pragmatic alternatives and offer a useful modus vivendi for building global governance measures on outer space.