India’s continued purchase of weapons and energy from Russia is raising difficulties in its relationship with the United States that are extending across the Indo-Pacific. This is not just a bilateral irritant. It has implications for the effectiveness of the Quad, regional stability and the long-term challenge of constraining China’s ambitions.

The US-India relationship has always required careful handling, but the return of Donald Trump to the presidency has brought fresh volatility. Trump’s frustration with the ongoing war in Ukraine—and with countries he views as insufficiently supportive of US efforts to isolate Russia—is now focused on India. His administration is reportedly considering secondary sanctions on countries buying Russian oil, and India’s substantial increase in Russian energy imports is drawing fire.

According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, India bought more than €200 billion worth of fossil fuels from Russia between the start of the full-scale attack on Ukraine and March 2025. Russian oil has grown from less than 1 percent to around 40 percent of India’s crude imports. On defence, while India has diversified procurement—signing major deals with the US, France and Israel—Russian arms still accounted for 36 percent of its military imports in 2020–24.

Under the Biden administration, there were already concerns over India’s ties with Moscow and its muted response to the 2022 assault of Ukraine. But Washington largely chose to work around those differences to preserve the broader strategic partnership. With Trump back in the Oval Office and with Russia’s war in Ukraine enduring, tolerance has understandably thinned.

Yet India’s Russia relationship is not easily cast aside. Moscow has been a key supplier of arms and a strategic partner for decades. Indian officials remain clear-eyed about this legacy.

They are pursuing what they call a ‘measured, calibrated, and professional’ approach towards the US. India continues to hope for a bilateral trade agreement with the US, aiming to lift trade from US$200 billion to US$500 billion by 2030.

But India’s patience has not been matched by Trump’s rhetoric. His claims of mediating India-Pakistan ceasefires were poorly received in New Delhi. The imposition of tariffs and punitive measures—partly due to India’s ties with Moscow—has had the unintended effect of uniting India’s political left and right in scepticism towards the US.

Despite the severe damage to the relationship, a permanent breakdown is unlikely. The US and India have invested too much in their partnership over the past two decades. More importantly, both see China as their principal long-term strategic competitor.

This shared assessment is what originally revived the Quad, the grouping that also includes Australia and Japan. It is too easily forgotten that Australia and the US let the first iteration of the Quad lapse in 2007 to avoid antagonising China. It was only from 2017, in the face of growing assertiveness from Beijing, that it was restored—and deepened.

Quad 2.0 has always been about more than military coordination. It is a platform for shaping regional technology standards, infrastructure investment and supply chain resilience. If Washington and New Delhi let their bilateral tensions escalate, it could stall progress on all these fronts—especially as Canberra and Tokyo also manage their own uncertainties about Trump’s second term.

The challenge now is to stabilise US-India ties without compromising core interests or indulging illusions about Russia. For India, that means recognising that Moscow’s strategic alignment with Beijing—manifest in the ‘no-limits’ China-Russia partnership—undermines Indian security. If forced to choose between India and China, Moscow will side with Beijing. That reality should inform Indian thinking about energy and arms dependencies.

For the US, it means understanding that India cannot sever ties with Russia overnight. But Trump’s approach makes clear that hedging is no longer a sustainable option for India. As necessary as this may be, the risk is it pushes India into a defensive crouch at a time when strategic clarity is most needed.

However, this moment of friction could be used to strengthen the partnership rather than weaken it. The ability to openly manage differences while deepening cooperation is what should distinguish US-India ties from the brittle, coercive dynamics that characterise China’s relationships. If Washington can demonstrate that it respects India’s sovereignty and strategic autonomy while offering real alternatives to Russian capabilities, it will make the partnership more resilient.

Australia, meanwhile, has a role to play. As a trusted partner of both Washington and New Delhi, Canberra should quietly reinforce the strategic logic of the Quad and help bridge differences. Australian leadership has helped sustain Quad momentum until now. That role is no less important now.

The Indo-Pacific is entering an era where strategic alignment and operational trust will matter more than ever. For India and the US, managing friction over Russia is not just about diplomatic optics. It is about ensuring their partnership remains a force multiplier in the only contest that truly matters: shaping a regional order where coercion is constrained and sovereignty respected.

 

This article replaces one that The Strategist published but withdrew on 4 August.