In his first year, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has re-energised the country’s engagement with the Islamic world through highly centralised, leader-led diplomacy. However, without institutional anchoring, the engagement effort is at risk from groupthink, poor coordination and unsustainability.

Indonesia’s choices will shape Middle East diplomacy, Gulf energy and defence–industrial links with Turkey. Prabowo’s first-year activism yields domestic political and economic upside for Indonesia and for the administration, but it will remain fragile unless it is institutionalised in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implementing agencies. Indonesia could turn greater visibility in the Islamic world into greater influence only by moving from presidential activism into state capacity.

Prabowo has built a reputation as a foreign policy president. Building on the profile he cultivated as defence minister, his first year has featured high-visibility outreach across the Islamic world, most notably on Palestine, alongside frequent travel and summit diplomacy. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, this emphasis aligns with a longstanding view to engage the Islamic world as part of its diplomatic identity. Even president Joko Widodo, widely viewed as a domestic-oriented president, pursued Gulf investment and attended the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation summits in person.

During his 2024 presidential election campaign, Prabowo pledged continuity. However, his first year has also introduced departures from priorities and style. The project to build a new national capital is no longer at the centre of the administration's attention. At the same time, flagship initiatives such as the free meals program have absorbed a significant amount of the state budget. In addition, Prabowo announced his plan to build a giant sea wall during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly. The question is not whether there is change, but whether it is being institutionalised.

Prabowo has adopted a highly centralised, presidential approach to foreign policy, rather than relying on Indonesia’s traditional diplomatic corps. Unlike his predecessor, whose international engagement was selective and economically driven, Prabowo has projected himself as a proactive global statesman. Within his first year in office, he has visited 25 countries and sought to position Indonesia as a leading voice in the Muslim world. While the pay-off is speed and efficiency, the trade-off is precision and coherence.

The activism delivers political benefit for the administration by consolidating Prabowo’s relationships with major Islamic organisations at home. And it provides Indonesia with economic benefits through investment and business opportunities. The test, however, is conversion: joint statements should become concrete projects and fielded capabilities.

Coordination gaps and mismatched implementation are already emerging as policy decisions outpace bureaucratic capacity. Career diplomats, long accustomed to steering Indonesia’s foreign affairs, may feel sidelined as key initiatives are driven directly by the president. As such, the concentration of power within a small, loyal inner circle also heightens the risk of groupthink, in which alternative voices are silenced and policy debates give way to conformity. Without institutional counterweights, especially from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the president risks operating within an echo chamber where loyalty substitutes critical evaluation.

Three domestic factors shape Prabowo’s approach. First, unlike his predecessor, Prabowo did not encounter heavy scrutiny over his Islamic credentials. Support from major organisations such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as Islamic parties, gives him greater diplomatic flexibility. As such, the goal has shifted from winning endorsement to maintaining coalition. Second, issues related to the Muslim world have been used to rationalise personnel and structural moves that consolidate executive control. Such political reorganisation is seen in appointments such as People’s Wave Party Chair Annis Matta as deputy foreign minister, focused on Indonesia’s diplomacy with the Islamic world; as well as in the elevation of allies such as Haikal Hassan in The Halal Product Assurance Organising Agency. Third, Prabowo is diversifying instruments beyond Jokowi’s investment-first agenda by pursuing defence cooperation with Turkey and some Middle Eastern countries while maintaining economic engagement and Islamic-solidarity rhetoric, including on Palestine and Rohingya issues.

According to a survey conducted by Indikator Politik last year, the Indonesian public considers three Muslim countries—Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—to be among its five closest allies. This public opinion implies the constraint on Indonesia’s relationships is not awareness, but delivery. Personalised foreign policy is prone to groupthink and controversy unless institutionalised.

Prabowo’s frequent visits and meetings with representatives of those Muslim countries exemplify Indonesia’s good relationship with the Islamic world. However, Indonesia needs to transform those symbolic gestures into meaningful outcomes, such as implemented agreements and action plans for issues close to the Muslim world.