So last month’s Bondi terrorist attack has prompted an independent review into Australia’s federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. But, since the same reviewer has already told a former government that the laws under which our policing and spy agencies operate are inadequate, can we expect this latest review to amount to any improvement of Australians’ security?

This review, announced by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, will be undertaken by eminent mandarin Dennis Richardson and inquire into who knew what and when about the alleged attackers in the lead-up to the horrific events of 14 December 2025, in which 15 people died. The review will also consider whether federal government agencies have adequate legislative powers and, if not, what amendments to the law are needed.

Richardson has become the go-to person for governments of both colours for a wide range of issues over the past decade, and not without good reason. As a former head of the Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and as a former ambassador to the United States, among other career highlights, he is surpassed by few if any in sheer experience at the top of the country’s national security architecture.

But if Richardson reviewing intelligence legislation sounds familiar, that is because he has form. More than six years ago, he thoroughly examined Australia’s national security laws, which was subsequently delivered to the government of the day. The Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community took 18 months to complete and produced a four-volume report of more than 1,300 pages that was delivered in late 2019. In it, Richardson made 203 recommendations to reform the laws governing the operations of Australia’s national security agencies.

One of the main recommendations made by Richardson and agreed to by the government was number 75, which said the existing laws governing electronic surveillance in Australia should be scrapped and replaced with a new, fit-for-purpose law. Richardson then made a further 57 recommendations about what such a law would look like.

At present, electronic surveillance is carried out by a range of Commonwealth agencies under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. Much of this law was written in the 1970s, when surveillance was less smartphones and more Get Smart shoe phones.

Subject to copious amendments to keep them current over the decades, the old laws were found by Richardson to be no longer fit-for-purpose. Hence, his verdict was that the gaps in surveillance and interception laws could no longer be merely papered over, but a knock-down rebuild was in order. The government agreed, and in 2021 the Electronic Surveillance Reform Taskforce was established in the Department of Home Affairs to deliver on the government’s commitment to reform this critical component of Australia’s national security laws, with bipartisan implementation support since then.

Five years later—and after being shifted to the Attorney-General’s Department, before being moved back into Home Affairs—the reforms are yet to be delivered. The only progress update to be found is on Home Affairs’ website, which simply states ‘the Department of Home Affairs is progressing this work’.

Given that the current review will only have four months to inquire and report to the government, that Richardson has already done much of the work on the national security legislation framework, and that most of his recommendations remain unimplemented, time will tell whether he merely points to his 2019 report in his latest suite of recommendations. Whether Richardson will be critical of the government—and more to the point, the public service—for moving so slowly on his previous tranche of reforms will be interesting to see.

Many questions remain over the events leading up to the Bondi terror attack, and the latest Richardson review is unlikely to answer them all. Complexity, confusion and classification all mean it is highly unlikely the Australian public will learn whether the Bondi terror attack was preventable by the national security agencies for which it pays handsomely.

This is especially so when the government’s chosen reviewer has already recommended sweeping changes be made to the laws under which those same agencies operate. It will be interesting to see if any of these unimplemented recommendations would have been used by ASIO and others to detect and prevent the Bondi terror attack.

In any instance, as yet another review gets underway, the public should ensure governments of the day heed advice when it is sought from experts. Further, the public should ensure governments drive their public services to implement those recommended changes they agree to, lest they stall and gather dust—especially when it comes to something so fundamental as our security.