The European Union has institutional capacity, regulatory power and operational experience that can support Australian priorities in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra should not miss the chance to work more closely with it.

Globalisation, networked infrastructure and hybrid threats are rapidly dissolving the separation between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s expanding strategic alignment with Moscow, and the growing use of cyber operations, economic coercion and foreign information manipulation all demonstrate that today’s security challenges operate across regions simultaneously.

Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy recognises this, emphasising resilience, preparedness and partnerships to counter grey zone pressure. Given its experience dealing with the Russian threat, the EU could be a useful partner in Australia’s pursuit of those priorities.

To do so, Australian policy-makers will need to look beyond narratives of European decline and assess the bloc’s actual capabilities.

A wave of online criticism aimed at France and, by extension, the EU has not helped the bloc’s reputation as a strategic security partner, portraying it as distracted by its own politics. France’s experience has shown how information dynamics can distort strategic judgment. Paris has been targeted across multiple domains, including beef import negotiations, defence industrial cooperation and even cultural and sports, including the Winter Olympics. By undermining the credibility of a key actor (France), hostile narratives seek to weaken confidence in the broader institutional framework it represents (the EU).

Australian policy should not be shaped by digital noise but grounded in strategic reality. As such, strengthening strategic ties with Brussels remains firmly in Australia’s interests.

By any practical measure, the EU remains a heavyweight. Together, its members offer  one of the world’s largest economies, with a GDP larger than China’s and with 450 million consumers, more than the United States’. More importantly, it has shown an ability to act collectively in response to geopolitical crises. Since 2022, the EU and its member states, working in conjunction with NATO allies, have sustained military, financial and intelligence support for Ukraine on a scale that surprised many observers.

The EU also wields influence as a global norms-setter in an increasingly deregulated world order. Instruments such as the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act shape how technology risks are managed worldwide. Through platforms such as the Munich Security Conference, European leaders have also been unafraid to warn the world about emerging dangers. At this year’s conference, for example, French President Emmanuel Macron’s and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s cautioned about China’s support for Russia.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles’s engagement with Germany and Belgium in February reflects Canberra’s recognition of Europe’s strategic relevance. As part of the coalition of the willing supporting Ukraine, and with its multicultural population including those of European background, Australia has recognised that European security affects Australia. The National Defence Strategy notes that conflict in Europe carries implications for the Indo-Pacific. Instability in Europe is affecting global supply chains, energy markets, sanctions regimes and military resource allocation. Practical cooperation with Brussels, supported by shared views on multilateralism and the rules-based order therefore contributes to Australia’s own security and stability.

Several avenues offer mutually beneficial opportunities for deeper cooperation. The first is countering foreign information manipulation and interference. The EU has formulated a mature toolbox for situational awareness, capacity building and response. The issue aligns closely with Australia’s efforts to counter disinformation and foreign interference.

Second, joint research offers significant potential. Since late last year, Australia has been exploring access to Horizon Europe to tap into the A$170 billion fund pool for international science and innovation collaboration. This is to further the almost two-decade Australia–EU partnership, especially in Copernicus, the Earth observation component of the EU space program for drought monitoring, flood forecasting and agriculture.

Lastly, collaboration could support regions of interest to both parties. Since 2020, the EU has implemented initiatives that may benefit Australia by sharing experience in regions of interest to Canberra. The EU-funded Enhancing security cooperation in and with Asia and the Critical Maritime Routes, which is bundled with the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing platform, would benefit Australia’s outreach and its desire for security and stability. Collaboration with the EU also means that Canberra does not have to carry the burden of regional engagement alone.

For example, an EU initiative on countering hybrid threats in Indo-Pacific implemented by ASPI seeks to promote inter-regional cooperation and explore options for future response mechanisms. Additionally, for building strategic resilience, EU members with overseas territories in the region would support Australia in up-lifting Pacific capability.

Negotiation with a region having multiple interests may take time but the EU offers regulatory leadership, technological collaboration, intelligence coordination and a growing willingness to project strategic influence beyond its neighbourhood. These are assets Australia should be leveraging.