Xi Jinping’s latest purge of top military officers probably reduces the chance of China taking imminent, deliberate military action to seize Taiwan. But many interpretations of the event are possible, and some imply an increased risk of war, perhaps accidental.
The Ministry of National Defence on 24 January announced investigations into Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chair Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli for ‘vile influence on the Party, the state and the military’. The move follows earlier removals and investigations that have steadily hollowed out senior military ranks, leaving the CMC so depleted it is now too small to justify a WeChat group chat.
Whether this makes a high-risk invasion attempt or blockade against Taiwan more or less likely depends mainly on whether Xi is correcting capability deficits or clearing political obstacles to force.
Purges at this level usually signal doubt, not confidence. Removing senior commanders and corrupt procurement networks suggests Xi believes internal reporting is unreliable, readiness overstated and critical systems compromised—or that the military is failing to meet the high performance benchmarks he has set. These include a goal, revealed by the United States, for the military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.
The purge highlights a clear trade-off: Xi is prioritising personal control over an institution that has historically maintained its own powerbase. While rational from a regime-security perspective, it imposes short-term costs on an organisation that depends on stable leadership, trusted reporting and cohesive planning.
The removal of an erstwhile ally, Zhang, also marks a break from recent practice, reinforcing Xi’s drive for total command authority while disrupting informal networks across the force.
When the current CMC was appointed in 2022, it had seven members. Now only Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin remain in effective office, making this the smallest CMC in the post-Mao era.
Beyond the CMC itself, the purge has swept widely: two defence ministers were removed in 2023 and 2024, at least eight senior generals were expelled in a single wave in late 2025, and several service, theatre, and procurement leaders have been sidelined in the past three years. Taken together, this represents a systemic hollowing-out of China’s professional military leadership.
Why the purge could make action less likely
There are several pathways by which the ongoing purge and specifically the latest two removals reduce the likelihood of Beijing choosing large-scale military action in the near term.
Capability confidence. If Xi is purging because corruption has undermined readiness or reliability, his benefit-cost calculation for use of any military action must be lower than it would otherwise be. An attempt at seizing Taiwan would be a systems test under fire, and a leader who doubts the integrity of reporting or equipment is unlikely to risk a campaign where failure would be strategically catastrophic.
Organisational friction. Anti-corruption campaigns absorb the attention of senior leaders, slow procurement and encourage institutional caution. While China’s military can sustain pressure operations around Taiwan in these circumstances, leadership churn degrades the planning and coordination that’s needed for a complex joint campaign, and especially when mistakes risk being recast as political disloyalty.
Command risk aversion. When leaders fall, subordinates learn to avoid responsibility. That instinct is corrosive to warfighting capacity and, until corrected, suppresses appetite for high-risk, irreversible decisions. Exacerbating this trend is the delicate balance between commanders and political commissars, which can cause operational bottlenecks.
Time and politics. The 2027 milestone is a capability target, not an invasion deadline. By exposing internal dysfunction, the purge makes it less likely that Beijing would choose that year for a discretionary war. It points to unresolved doubts about readiness.
Why it could make action more likely
Reasons for thinking the purge increases war risk are not so strong but cannot be ignored.
Command streamlining. A particularly concerning interpretation is that the purge is preparation, not a cause for hesitation.
A leader contemplating escalation needs a chain of command that executes orders without hesitation or internal bargaining. Removing senior figures, particularly those with independent networks, can tighten political obedience and central control, streamlining decision-making at the expense of increased operational risk.
Coercive proof-of-life. After leadership upheaval, Beijing has incentives to demonstrate that the military remains capable. This may take the form of more assertive military coercive activity around Taiwan, including larger drills and denser air and maritime operations. This increases the risk of action by normalising higher-tempo operations, and raising the probability that routine coercion spills into escalation through miscalculation or incident.
Over-compliance below the top. The ongoing purge suggests that Xi is not encouraging autonomous risk-taking but rather enforcing strict adherence to his strategic guidance, penalising commanders who exercise independent judgement or build personal power bases. This may prompt ambitious officers to execute authorised pressure campaigns around Taiwan more visibly, more frequently or with less tactical restraint. The risk of incidents or miscalculation in the crowded operating environment of the Taiwan Strait would rise, even as ultimate decision-making remains firmly under Xi’s control.
Conclusion
Overall, the purge is best understood as a correction to increase Xi’s confidence in and control over the military, not as a prelude to imminent war, and as a political manoeuvre to dismantle power bases within the armed forces that are outside his own networks. Reflecting doubts about readiness, the move is likely to reduce the probability of a deliberate, large-scale operation against Taiwan in the near term—say, in the next two or three years.
The purge does not signal de-escalation. It may increase the risk of sharper coercive pressure short of invasion, and it reinforces the point that 2027 is not a fixed invasion deadline. Xi will act on his own assessment of confidence and control.
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